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Abstract
As our sensitive data is increasingly carried over the Internet and stored remotely, security
in communications becomes a fundamental requirement. Yet, today’s security practices are
designed around assumptions the validity of which is being challenged. In this thesis we
design new security mechanisms for certain scenarios where traditional security assumptions
do not hold.
First, we design secret-agreement protocols for wireless networks, where the security of the
secrets does not depend on assumptions about the computational limitations of adversaries.
Our protocols leverage intrinsic characteristics of the wireless to enable nodes to agree on
common pairwise secrets that are secure against computationally unconstrained adversaries.
Through testbed and simulation experimentation, we show that it is feasible in practice to
create thousands of secret bits per second.
Second, we propose a trafﬁc anonymization scheme for wireless networks. Our protocol
aims in providing anonymity in a fashion similar to Tor – yet being resilient to computation-
ally unbounded adversaries – by exploiting the security properties of our secret-agreement.
Our analysis and simulation results indicate that our scheme can offer a level of anonymity
comparable to the level of anonymity that Tor does.
Third, we design a lightweight data encryption protocol for protecting against computationally
powerful adversaries in wireless sensor networks. Our protocol aims in increasing the inherent
weak security that network coding naturally offers, at a low extra overhead. Our extensive
simulation results demonstrate the additional security beneﬁts of our approach.
Finally, we present a steganographic mechanism for secret message exchange over untrust-
worthy messaging service providers. Our scheme masks secret messages into innocuous texts,
aiming in hiding the fact that secret message exchange is taking place. Our results indicate
that our schemes succeeds in communicating hidden information at non-negligible rates.
Key words: security, secret key generation, anonymizing networks, linguistic steganography
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Riassunto
Poiché una sempre maggiore quantità di dati sensibili viene inviata via Internet ed immagaz-
zinata nella rete, la sicurezza delle comunicazioni diventa un tema sempre più importante.
Allo stesso tempo la validità di alcune delle ipotesi, sulle quali le pratiche di sicurezza in uso
sono state pensate, è messa in discussione. In questa tesi proponiamo nuovi meccanismi di
sicurezza, il cui funzionamento è garantito anche se alcune di queste ipotesi non sono valide.
Nella prima parte proponiamo un protocollo di generazione di chiavi per reti senza ﬁli, la cui
sicurezza non dipende dalla tradizionale ipotesi che vuole la capacità di calcolo degli avversari
limitata. Il protocollo proposto sfrutta le caratteristiche intrinseche della comunicazione senza
ﬁli per permettere ad ogni coppia di nodi della rete di accordarsi su delle chiavi che sono
sicure da un avversario con capacità di calcolo illimitate. Grazie ad un banco di prova e ad
esperimenti simulati mostriamo che con questo protocollo è possibile creare migliaia di bit
segreti per secondo.
Nella seconda parte proponiamo un schema che permette di comunicare in forma anonima
in reti senza ﬁli. Il nostro protocollo mira ad offrire un’anonimia simile a quella offerta dal
protocollo Tor – ma, a differenza di quest’ultimo, è in grado di resistere ad attacchi d’un
avversario con capacità di calcolo illimitate – grazie all’uso del protocollo di generazione
di chiavi proposto nella prima parte. La nostra analisi e i risultati delle nostre simulazioni
indicano che questo schema offre un livello d’anonimia simile a quello raggiunto da Tor.
Nella terza parte progettiamo un protocollo di criptazione per proteggere le comunicazioni
nelle reti di sensori senza ﬁli da avversari con capacità di calcolo illimitate. Il nostro protocollo
mira a migliorare la sicurezza che naturalmente la codiﬁca di rete garantisce, usando le scarse
risorse disponibili su sensori a basso consumo energetico. I risultati delle nostre simulazioni
mostrano che il nostro protocollo porta ad un miglioramento della sicurezza.
Per ﬁnire presentiamo un meccanismo di steganograﬁa che permette di scambiare messaggi
attraverso un fornitore di servizi di messaggistica di cui non si ha completa ﬁducia. Il nostro
schema nasconde i messaggi segreti in testo dal contenuto apparentemente innocuo, al ﬁne di
nascondere il fatto che il messaggio segreto è stato inviato. I nostri esperimenti mostrano che
lo schema riesce a comunicare l’informazione nascosta a velocità di trasmissione signiﬁcative.
v
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1 Introduction
Security is a fundamental requirement in communications and the development of new
security practices is an ever on-going process: with constant technological progress, new
security challenges and threats continuously arise. As we proceed in the era of pervasive
computing and connectivity, and a signiﬁcant fraction of our sensitive data is carried over
the Internet and stored remotely, security becomes an indispensable necessity. Yet, the
remarkable technological advances that revolutionize the availability of computing power and
connectivity come to challenge the validity of traditional assumptions in the foundations of
today’s security practices.
Current cryptographic approaches to security are designed around computational-hardness
assumptions: security breach cannot be reached in useful time since the adversaries do
not posses the essential computational power. Recent technological advances in quantum
computing [22], indicate, though, that computations that have been traditionally considered
as “intractable” could become feasible in the very near future. As the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) stresses out in a recent report [75], “within the next
twenty or so years sufﬁciently large quantum computers will be built to break essentially
all public key schemes currently in use”, enabling adversaries to “seriously compromise
the conﬁdentiality and integrity of digital communications on the Internet ”. There exists,
therefore, an evident urgency to explore alternative approaches to security that do not rely
anymore on computational-hardness assumptions.
Another traditional assumption being challenged is the “trustworthiness” assumption. We
normally trust the various entities of a dedicated communication infrastructure we use, to
respect the privacy of our communications and data. Nevertheless, trusted network entities,
such as our ISP or our e-mail provider, may betray our trust for various reasons, including
(but not limited to) maximizing their proﬁts, e.g., by selling our data to other companies, or
being legally forced to do so by third parties, e.g., by powerful governments or corporations.
The latter threat is not placed far in the future but is indeed already present. For example,
according to Google’s Transparency Report [44] (as of 2016) the company “regularly receives
requests from governments and courts around the word to hand over user data”. Only in the
1
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year 2014, Google received 62 thousand such requests, with the amount escalating through
the years (24 thousand requests in 2010), out of which the company complied with 63%,
resulting into handing over data for approximately 100 thousand user accounts. This is a
clear indication that we should gradually start considering these threats that were harmless to
ignore so far.
In this thesis we design new security mechanisms for protecting against adversaries in some
certain where traditional assumptions do not hold. Our goal is to provide practical schemes
that can be viewed both as alternatives and complements to existing practices, without requir-
ing signiﬁcant changes in the existing infrastructure. The contributions of this thesis are in
three different ﬁelds of communications security: information-theoretic security, anonymiz-
ing networks and steganography.
Information-theoretic, or unconditional, security is a prominent technique for encountering
computationally powerful adversaries, since its effectiveness does not rely on their computa-
tional limitations but rather on the fact that they simply do not posses enough information
to breach security. The information theory community has long ago demonstrated the the-
oretical feasibility of exploiting intrinsic characteristics of the wireless channel for building
information theoretic secrets [98, 67]. Despite the large number of theoretical contributions
in this ﬁeld, there have been few advances toward developing concrete secret-agreement
protocols that effectively operate on actual wireless networks with large number of nodes. In
this thesis we aim toward this direction and we design practical secret-agreement protocols
for establishing simultaneously pairwise secrets among all nodes in arbitrary wireless net-
works, and a data encryption protocol for enhancing the inherent weak information-theoretic
security that network coding offers in wireless sensor networks.
Anonymized networking is a recent approach to secure communications in the Internet and
its goal is to enable users to hide the trace of their communications: by observing the trafﬁc
at a part of the network, it should be infeasible to link a message to its originator and its
ﬁnal destination. This approach aims in addressing the problem where the assumption of
privacy of communications is not guaranteed due to luck of trust in the communication
infrastructure. There exist various examples of such networks with Tor [38] being the most
widely used among them. In the core of the Tor system basic cryptographic primitives are
used, e.g., the Difﬁe-Hellman key-agreement, RSA and AES encryption, making, therefore,
Tor vulnerable to computationally powerful adversaries. In this thesis we design a trafﬁc
anynomization protocol for wireless networks that builds on the capabilities of our secret-
agreement protocols to offer anonymity in a fashion similar to Tor, yet being robust against
computationally powerful adversaries.
Steganography is the practice of hiding information within innocuous data, in such a way that
only the intended communication parties know that a piece of data carries hidden information
and are able to extract it. Steganographic techniques aim in addressing the problem where
private communication is not allowed by the infrastructure, but its users still wish for this
2
property. Carriers for embedding hidden information include images, videos, audio ﬁles
or text. The latter case is usually referred to as linguistic steganography and requires tools
from both Natural Language Processing (NLP) and communications security ﬁelds. Existing
linguistic steganographic techniques (a) enable the transfer of only a few secret bits per
communication round, and (b) require off-line access to sophisticated NLP tools and large
linguistic resources, being, therefore, quite impractical to use. In this thesis we design an
implementable linguistic steganographic mechanism for exchanging short private messages,
in the order of a few hundreds of bits, over untrustworthy messaging service providers.
Our Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are the following:
• First, we design practical secret-agreement protocols for wireless networks, that build
on recent theoretical results in information-theoretic security [89, 88]. We leverage
broadcast and the existence of packet erasures that naturally arise in wireless networks,
in order to enable a set of nodes to simultaneously agree on common pairwise secrets,
simply by exchanging trafﬁc among them, both in single-hop and in arbitrary multi-hop
networks. The security of the secrets we produce does not depend on computational
or memory limitations of an adversary, but rather on her limited network presence,
i.e., the fact that she cannot overhear every transmission in the network. We evaluate
our protocols through testbed experimentation and simulations, and we show that it
is feasible in practice to create thousands of secret bits per second, without assuming
anything about the adversary’s computational capabilities.
• Second, we propose a trafﬁc anonymization scheme for wireless networks that builds
on the capabilities of the secrets we construct using our secret-agreement protocols.
Our trafﬁc anonymization protocol aims in providing anonymity in a fashion similar to
Tor [38]: Tor achieves anonymity by bouncing encrypted communications around a dis-
tributed network of relays; we similarly bounce encrypted communications among the
wireless network nodes. By leveraging the capabilities of our secrets, that do not depend
on cryptographic primitives, our approach is resilient to computationally unbounded
adversaries. Our privacy analysis and simulation results indicate that our approach can
offer a level of anonymity comparable to the level of anonymity that Tor does.
• Third, we design a lightweight data encryption protocol, suitable for wireless sensor
networks, that builds on top of the operations of a data collection protocol that employs
network coding. We leverage the shared information between nodes and the sink across
communication rounds to enable secure data delivery under the presence of network
limited, yet computationally unconstrained adversaries. Our approach can be viewed
as an enhancement of the weak security that network coding inherently offers, with low
additional operational complexity. We experimentally evaluate the performance of our
protocol over several settings and we demonstrate that our approach yields substantial
3
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improvements in comparison to the level of weak security that network coding naturally
offers.
• Finally, we design a linguistic steganographic mechanism for enabling exchange of
short secret messages over untrustworthy messaging service providers. We propose a
semi-automated approach that masks a secret message into innocuous text by involving
the “user-in-the-loop”; the message is initially mapped to a sequence of linguistic words
that the user enhances to produce the ﬁnal text. Our approach does not require off-line
access to large linguistic resources and sophisticated NLP tools and it is easily imple-
mentable. We implement our design and we evaluate its performance by experimenting
with human users, through the Mechanical Turk platform [15], and by applying steganal-
ysis methods that we design. Our results indicate that (a) our approach succeeds in
embedding a large number of hidden bits, without requiring an unreasonable amount
of user-effort, and (b) the “user-in-the-loop” involvement helps in hiding the existence
of steganography.
Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 presents the design, theoretical
analysis and experimental evaluation of our secret-agreement protocols. Chapter 3 presents
the design, privacy analysis and performance evaluation of our Tor-like trafﬁc anonymization
scheme, that leverages the properties of the secrets we produce with our secret-agreement
protocols. Chapter 4 presents the design, theoretical analysis and the experimental evaluation
of our data encryption protocol for wireless sensor networks. Chapter 5 presents the design,
the steganalysis attacks and the evaluation of our linguistic steganographic mechanism.
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2 Secret-agreement Protocols
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider the problem where a group of n wireless nodes that form an ad-hoc
wireless network, want to create
(n
2
)
pairwise secrets, such that a passive eavesdropper Eve,
who is located in an unknown position in the network, learns very little about them. We are
interested in strong information-theoretical or unconditional security, where the security of
the secrets does not depend on computational limitations of Eve, but rather on the fact that
Eve does not posses enough information to breach security. We are investigating, whether it is
possible to offer strong security, as the number of nodes n and number of pairwise secrets
increases, and over arbitrary wireless topologies.
In recent years, there has been signiﬁcant interest in building information-theoretical security
out of wireless channel properties, but the work has been limited to very speciﬁc topologies
and scenaria. The majority of the work considers pairwise key generation over a single channel
with a single source and receiver [98, 67] (see also [54] and references therein); the few works
that have looked at multiple receivers still only consider a single source and receivers within
the same broadcast domain [37, 39]. Works that look at larger networks typically do not
provide strong, but weak information security guarantees [20, 95, 14], and mostly focus on
singlemessage distribution, as opposed to creating
(n
2
)
different secret keys (see also section 2.9
on related work). Moreover, in most of the proposed practical works, the secret key generation
rates achieved are only a few tens of bits per second [100, 62, 80]. In contrast, we show in this
chapter that can we leverage both channel and network properties, to create pairwise keys at
rates that are of the order of Kb per second, for arbitrary n and wireless network topologies.
First, we present a basic secret-agreement protocol, which enables n nodes connected to the
same broadcast domain to create pairwise secrets that Eve knows very little about. Our proto-
col leverages the broadcast nature of the wireless to create pairwise secrets between all pair of
nodes simultaneously, has polynomial time complexity and is readily implementable in simple
wireless devices. We analyze our protocol in two ways: (i) Under standard information-theory
assumptions (independent erasure channels between nodes and known erasure probabilities),
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we formally show that: (1) Our basic protocol is information-theoretically secure, i.e., it leaks
no information to Eve about the secrets. (2) It achieves a secret-generation rate that is opti-
mal for n = 2 nodes and scales well with the number of nodes n. (ii) Through experimental
evaluation, and estimation of the network parameters, as we discuss later.
Second, we consider secret-agreement over arbitrary, multi-hop networks. This is important,
ﬁrstly, from a practical point of view: even when networks have a small number of nodes,
as connectivity is impaired from distance, interference and other impediments (e.g., metal
obstructions), it is challenging to consistently maintain a single-hop connected network.
Secondly, multi-hop networks are also interesting from a technical point of view since they
provide two new opportunities for secrecy that we could leverage: interference and multi-
path propagation. Interference between concurrent transmissions (such as caused by the
hidden terminal problem) may interfere with Eve’s reception but not with the reception of
other legitimate nodes; distinct packet propagation through multiple paths can ensure that
Eve, located in an unknown but ﬁxed position in our network, does not have access to all
of them, and again misses packets that legitimate nodes receive. Finally, secret-agreement
over arbitrary multi-hop networks can enable applications similar to the one we describe in
chapter 3.
We design a secret-agreement protocol for multi-hop networks, that builds on our basic
protocol, but also comprises new design features that realize the beneﬁts multi-hop offers
for secrecy. This includes a customized packet dissemination protocol that balances two
conﬂicting goals: spreading the packets as efﬁciently and as widely as possible among the
legitimate nodes, while ensuring that a signiﬁcant fraction of packets will not be overheard
by Eve, who could be located in any place within the network. Our protocol is completely
decentralized, does not differentiate between nodes and is readily implementable in simple
wireless devices.
Third, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our protocols and we provide evidence
that it is feasible in practice to create pairwise secrets at rates of thousands of bits per second
in realistic setups. In the experimental setup, we assume no knowledge of channel parameters,
and no knowledge of Eve’s location or collected information – we estimate the quantities we
need online. For the single-hop case, we use a small wireless testbed and for the multi-hop
case we simulate different network conﬁgurations, consisting of up to 500 nodes and located
up to 5-hops apart. We show that we can achieve secret generation rates in the magnitude of
Kbps, independently from the adversary’s computational capabilities.
The work presented in this chapter has been presented in [86] and [84].
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2.2 Setup
SystemModel
We consider a set of n wireless nodes, T1, . . . ,Tn , that form an ad-hoc network. We will refer to
these nodes as legitimate terminals, or simply terminals. Sometimes we will refer to terminals
T1, T2, T3, and T4 respectively as Alice, Bob, Calvin, and David.
We capture the network structure using two parameters:
• Number of hops describes the maximum distance (in hops) between any two terminals.
More formally, in a k-hop network, for any two terminals Ti/Tj in the network there
exists a k-hop path Ti ,r1, . . . ,rk−1,Tj with k−1 intermediate terminals such that every
terminal is the neighbor of its preceding terminal along the path; moreover, there exists
at least one pair of terminals for which there is no path with k−1 hops.
• Network density expresses the expected number of terminals per unit network area; it
affects the expected number of neighbors that a terminal has. We deﬁne the unit area
as an 1-hop network, i.e., a network where all terminals are within the same broadcast
domain.
The terminals communicate with each other in three ways:
• When we say that terminal Ti transmits a packet, we mean that it broadcasts the packet
once, within its broadcast domain.
• When we say that terminal Ti reliably broadcasts a packet, we mean that it ensures
that all other terminals Tj =i in the whole network receive it, e.g., through ACKs and
re-transmissions.
• When we say that terminal Ti unicasts a packet to terminal Tj , we mean that the packet
is intended only for terminal Tj and it might get re-transmitted up to a certain number
of times.
Each terminal in the network has a unique id, that is revealed to all other terminals, and it can
generate and transmit random packets. A random packet has a payload of L symbols over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq and thus has a size of L logq bits. The payload of a random packet is drawn from
the uniform distribution. Each packet has a unique identiﬁer, that consists of the generator’s
unique id together with a sequence number.
We assume that in our network packet erasures occur. A terminal experiences a packet erasure,
or simply misses a packet (knows nothing about its content), if the packet gets transmitted
in the network but cannot get received by the terminal’s radio receiver. Packet erasures may
occur in our network due to different effects (and/or combinations of these) that inherently
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arise in wireless networks: channel noise and fading (low reception SNR), collisions because
of concurrent transmissions, a packet was transmitted outside a terminal’s reception region
etc. Independently of the causing effect(s), whenever a terminal’s radio receiver was not able
to lock on a packet’s transmitted physical signal, we account this event as a packet erasure.
Our goal is to design protocols, that exploit packet erasures, in order to enable each pair of
terminals in the network, Ti /Tj , to create a secret Si j , that is secure from an adversary as we
model in the following.
AdversaryModel
We assume that in our network there exists a passive1 adversary Eve, a non-legitimate node
located at an unknown position, who eavesdrops every transmission in her reception region.
Eve does not make any transmission herself, but uses the eavesdropped information at her
disposal to compromise the security of the secrets created by the legitimate terminals.
We assume that Eve has access to the same physical layer (radio technology, number of
antennas etc.) as the legitimate terminals – experiencing, therefore, packet erasures as they do.
However, we also assume that Eve has inﬁnite memory as well as unbounded computational
capabilities at her disposal; this would follow the model of an adversary that does not want
to reveal her presence by using specialized equipment, yet has ofﬂine access to unbounded
resources to breach security. Moreover, we assume that Eve has perfect knowledge of the
protocols used, of the network topology and of the terminals’ identities. To be conservative,
we also assume that Eve receives correctly all reliably broadcasted and unicasted (as deﬁned
in section 2.2) packets. Eve, using her knowledge, can optimally position herself inside the
network, and keep her position secret. However, she has limited network presence; in the
following we assume that she is situated in a single position, yet this assumption can be relaxed
in the case where Eve is in multiple positions, as we discussed in [85].
Apart from the existence of Eve, we additionally assume that every legitimate terminal Ti
in the network may act as “honest but curious” towards the other terminals: Ti runs the
secret-agreement protocols honestly but may as well try to eavesdrop on other terminals’
communications. Note that, this additional assumption, is not related to the behavior of Eve
(she remains a passive adversary that reveals nothing about her knowledge) and does not
weaken our adversary model. In contrast, with this assumption we aim for protection in a
stricter context than if we only considered the behavior of Eve: our ultimate goal is to create(n
2
)
different secrets between all pairs of nodes, in such a way so that every pairwise secret is
secure from Eve but also from any other honest but curious node in the network.
1We discuss the case where Eve is an active adversary in section 2.8.
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Possible Use-Case Scenarios
A possible use-case would correspond to the scenario where a group of n political dissidents
rendezvous in a public place (potentially under visual surveillance) and use their cell phones in
ad-hoc mode to secretly communicate; or the scenario where a group of n friends connect to
the same social network and use their cell phones in ad-hoc mode to exchange private content.
It should be infeasible for an eavesdropper who listens in on the same broadcast domain to
record what she overhears, process the recording, and reconstruct their communications.
Moreover, it should be infeasible for an eavesdropper to record what she overhears, extract
from the dissidents/friends a set of passwords or keys, combine them with the recording, and
reconstruct their communications. The dissidents/friends can periodically use our protocol
to create pairwise secrets and use these secrets to continuously refresh the keys with which
they encrypt/authenticate their communications.
Theoretical Network Conditions
We deﬁne the theoretical network conditions as follows:
1. When terminal Ti transmits a packet, terminal Tj (Eve):
- misses the entire packet, with probability δi j (δiE )
- receives the entire packet correctly, otherwise.
δi j (δiE ) is the erasure probability of the Ti – Tj (Ti – Eve) channel.
2. TheTi –Tj channel is independent from anyTi –Tl = j channel2 and theTi – Eve channel,
for all i , j , l .
3. The erasure probability δiE of the Ti – Eve channel is known, for all i .
PerformanceMetrics
We use the following metrics to evaluate the performance of our secret-agreement protocols:
• Efﬁciency captures the cost of the protocol, i.e., the amount of trafﬁc it produces in order
to generate pairwise secrets of a given size. The efﬁciency achieved by two terminals Ti
and Tj that create a secret Si j , of length |Si j | bits, is deﬁned as:
Ei j =
|Si j |
total tr ansmi t ted bi t s
.
The denominator is the total number of bits transmitted by the protocol until Si j is
created. In the case of multi-hop setups, this number includes re-transmissions of
random packets from terminals other than the generator terminals.
2Assuming independent channels is not necessary for any of our results, but simpliﬁes our proofs.
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• Secrecy rate measures how many secret bits per second are created between a pair of
terminals; the secrecy rate is a function of the efﬁciency and the transmission rate.
• Reliability captures the quality of the created secrets, i.e., the extent to which they are
unknown to Eve. The reliability of a secret S is deﬁned as:
RS = H(S|XE )
H(S) ,
whereXE is the information obtained by Eve via eavesdropping on the terminals’ com-
munications, H(S) is Eve’s entropy (her uncertainty about S before she eavesdrops),
and H(S|XE ) is Eve’s conditional entropy (her uncertainty about S after she eaves-
drops). RS = 1 implies information-theoretical secrecy: I (S ;E)= 0; in other words, Eve
does not learn anything about S by observing the protocol and the produced trafﬁc.
RS < 1 means that Eve can correctly guess the value of one bit of generated secret with
probability higher than 0.5, e.g., RS = 0.8 means that this probability is 2−0.8 = 0.57.
If the terminals had knowledge of the exact information observed by Eve via eavesdropping,
they would always be able to construct the longest possible secrets of reliability 1 (information-
theoretically secure secrets). In practice, the terminals do not have access to this knowledge;
the best they could do is to compute an estimate XˆE of XE . Under well-deﬁned network
models this estimation can become arbitrarily good, enabling the terminals to create secrets,
using our protocols, of reliability 1 (we show this for the case of the erasure channel model
in section 2.5 and Appendices A.1, A.2). In real-world wireless networks, where theoretical
conditions do not hold, the terminals need to heuristically compute this estimation (we
elaborate on this in section 2.6). Needless to mention, in case they underestimate XˆE , the
constructed secrets will have reliability less than 1.
In section 2.7, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our secret-agreement protocols
by measuring (i) the ideal efﬁciency/secrecy rate; this is the efﬁciency/rate achieved by an
oracle-assisted protocol, that is, a protocol that works like ours, with the only difference that it
does not estimate howmuch information Eve obtains through eavesdropping – that knowledge
is directly provided to the legitimate terminals by the oracle, (ii) the effective efﬁciency/secrecy
rate that is achieved by our protocols, where secrets are constructed based on estimations
of Eve’s knowledge. The reliability is a metric that allows us to capture how close does our
protocol behave to the oracle-assisted one. Ideally, we would like our protocols to achieve
high efﬁciency/secrecy rate, along with reliability scores as close as possible to 1.
2.3 Basic Secret-agreement Protocol
In this section, we describe the core of our secret-agreement protocol, that enables terminals
Ti and Tj , which are connected in the same broadcast domain, i.e., they form a single-hop
network, to create a secret Si j . Assuming the theoretical network conditions (as deﬁned in
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Symbol Meaning
n Number of terminals
Ti Terminal i
Si j Secret between terminals Ti and Tj
δi j Erasure probability of Ti – Tj channel
δiE Erasure probability of Ti – Eve channel
N Number of x-packets transmitted by each terminal
(initial phase, step 1)
Mi j Number of shared y-packets constructed by Ti and Tj
(privacy ampliﬁcation phase, steps 1 – 3)
Table 2.1 – Commonly used symbols in our secret-agreement protocols.
section 2.2), Si j is perfectly secret from any terminal Tk =i , j and an adversary Eve (we show this
in section 2.5.1). In Table 2.1 we explain the meaning of commonly used symbols throughout
this section.
Main Idea
Suppose Alice and Bob exchange three random packets, x1, x2 and x3. Suppose Eve misses
(knows nothing about the contents of) two of the packets shared by Alice and Bob, x1 and x2.
If an oracle told Alice and Bob that Eve misses two of their shared packets (but not which two),
they could create a perfect shared secret (one that Eve knows nothing about), by using two
linear combinations of their shared packets, e.g., 〈x1+x2,x2+x3〉3 (where + denotes addition
over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, e.g., bit wise XOR over the binary ﬁeld).
Building on this idea, our protocol consists of two phases: In the initial phase, the terminals
exchange trafﬁc to ensure that each terminal pair shares some number of random packets
(as Alice and Bob share x1, x2, and x3 in the example above). This happens over n rounds,
with a different terminal transmitting in each round. In the privacy ampliﬁcation phase, each
terminal pair creates a secret out of the information they shared in the initial phase. For this,
they “compress” their shared information enough to ensure that any other terminal or Eve
know nothing about the secret (as Alice and Bob “compress” x1, x2, and x3 into x1+x2, x2+x3
in the example above). To do this compression correctly, the terminals need to know how
much of their trafﬁc exchange was overheard by Eve (but not which particular bits).
A naive approach would be to have each terminal pair create their secret separately, which
would not scale well with the number of terminals. Instead, our protocol creates the pairwise
secrets simultaneously, by harnessing the broadcast nature of wireless networks.
3This secret is perfect, because Eve’s probability of guessing its value is equal to the probability of guessing the
values of the two packets she misses.
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2.3.1 Algorithm
Each terminal Ti maintains n−1 queuesQi j , j = i . In the beginning, these are empty.
Initial Phase
In round r = 1. . .n:
1. Terminal Tr generates and transmits N random packets (we will call them x-packets).
2. Each terminal Ti =r reliably broadcasts the identiﬁers of the x-packets it received.
3. Each terminal Ti adds to queue Qi j the identiﬁers and contents of the x-packets it
shares with terminal Tj =i .
At this point,Qi j contains all the packets shared by terminals Ti and Tj .
Privacy Ampliﬁcation Phase
For i = 1. . .n−1:
1. Terminal Ti constructs Mi j linear combinations of the packets in the queueQi j , for
all j > i (we will call them y-packets). It determines the number of y-packets Mi j and
constructs the y-packets as described in section 2.3.2.
2. Terminal Ti reliably broadcasts the coefﬁcients it used to construct the y-packets.
3. Each terminal Tj>i uses the broadcasted coefﬁcients and the contents of its queueQ j i
to reconstruct the Mi j y-packets.
At this point, terminals Ti and Tj>i share Mi j y-packets. Their secret Si j is the concatenation
of these y-packets.
An Example Agreement
Suppose we have n = 3 terminals, Alice, Bob, and Calvin, and a passive adversary, Eve. All the
channels between terminals or any terminal and Eve have erasure probability δ= 0.5.
In the initial phase, the terminals create shared information by exchanging packets. In the
ﬁrst round, Alice transmits N = 8 x-packets, a1,a2, . . .a8, of which Bob, Calvin, and Eve receive
(not the same) half. Similarly, in the second and third rounds, Bob transmits b1,b2, . . .b8, and
Calvin transmits c1,c2, . . .c8. Alice, Bob, and Calvin know which x-packets are received by one
another (thanks to Step 2 of the initial phase), but not which x-packets are received by Eve.
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Alice Bob Calvin Eve
a1,a2, . . .a8 a1,a2,a3,a4 a1,a2,a5,a6 a1,a3,a5,a7
b1,b2,b3,b4 b1,b2, . . .b8 b1,b2,b5,b6 b1,b3,b5,b7
c1,c2,c3,c4 c1,c2,c5,c6 c1,c2, . . .c8 c1,c3,c5,c7
Table 2.2 – Information known to each node.
Phase Alice – Bob Alice – Calvin Bob – Calvin
¯a1, a¯2,a3,a4 ¯a1, a¯2,a5,a6 ¯a1, a¯2
Initial ¯b1, b¯2,b3,b4 ¯b1, b¯2 ¯b1, b¯2,b5,b6
¯c1, c¯2 ¯c1, c¯2,c3,c4 ¯c1, c¯2,c5,c6
a3+a4 a5+a6 b5+b6
Privacy a1+a2+a3 a1+a2+a5 b1+b2+b5
Amp. b3+b4 c3+c4 c5+c6
b1+b2+b3 c1+c2+c3 c1+c2+c5
Table 2.3 – Information shared by nodes.
Table 2.2 shows the x-packets known to each node at the end of the initial phase. Table 2.3
(top row) shows the x-packets shared by each terminal pair at the end of the initial phase (e.g.,
Alice and Bob share a1,a2,a3,a4 among others). To help visualize who knows which x-packets,
from the x-packets shared by Alice/Bob, we mark those known to Eve4 as “canceled out” (e.g.,
a3), those known to Calvin as “barred” (e.g., a¯2), and those known to both Eve and Calvin as
both canceled out and barred (e.g.,¯a1). We do the same for the other terminal pairs.
In the privacy ampliﬁcation phase, the terminals create pairwise secrets by compressing their
shared information. Alice and Bob compress their 10 shared x-packets into M12 = 4 shared y-
packets (linear combinations of the shared x-packets). Similarly, Alice/Calvin and Bob/Calvin
compress their 10 shared x-packets into 4 shared y-packets. Table 2.3 (bottom row) shows
the y-packets shared by each terminal pair. Notice that Eve cannot reconstruct any of these
y-packets; she misses at least one x-packet in every linear combination constructed by the
terminal pairs (e.g., Eve misses packet a4, hence she cannot reconstruct the y-packet a3+a4,
that Alice and Bob have constructed and serves as one of their pairwise secrets). For the
same reason, Calvin cannot reconstruct the y-packets constructed by Alice and Bob for their
pairwise secret (e.g., Calvin misses packet b3, he cannot, therefore, reconstruct the y-packet
b1 +b2 +b3). Similarly, Alice ( Bob) cannot reconstruct the y-packets constructed by Bob
(Alice) and Calvin for their pairwise secret.
This was an example to give a sense of how things work. Our protocol does not really construct
so simple linear combinations (e.g., 4 random linear combinations out of 10 x-packets), as
they may leak information to Eve (section 2.3.2).
4For sake of simplicity, we assume (only in this example) that this knowledge is provided to Alice, Bob and
Calvin. In our protocol, the knowledge of Eve has to be estimated by the legitimate terminals; however, they do not
need to estimate which packets Eve has overheard only how many (see section 2.3.2).
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Key Points
The size of the secret between two terminals depends on (1) the amount of information shared
by the two terminals and (2) how much of this information Eve and the other terminals have
missed. In the above example, Alice and Bob share 10 x-packets. Of these, Eve misses 5, and
Calvin misses 4. Hence, Alice and Bob can construct up to 5 y-packets (linear combinations
of their shared x-packets) that are perfectly secret from Eve, and up to 4 y-packets that are
perfectly secret from Calvin. Since we want the Alice/Bob secret to be unknown to both
Eve and Calvin, Alice/Bob should create only 4 y-packets. Creating a shorter secret would
be inefﬁcient. Creating a longer secret would necessarily result in Eve or Calvin knowing
something about the secret (though not necessarily the entire secret).
An important feature of the protocol is that terminals Ti and Tj create shared information
during all the rounds of the initial phase, not only when one of them transmits. In the above
example, at the end of the initial phase, Alice and Bob share not only x-packets transmitted
by one of them, but also x-packets transmitted by Calvin (c1,c2). In the particular example,
these packets turn out not to be useful in creating the Alice/Bob secret, because Calvin knows
both of them (and we want the secret to be unknown to Calvin). However, when we have
more than n = 3 terminals, leveraging x-packets transmitted by all terminals becomes key to
the protocol’s scalability with the number of terminals. For instance, imagine that there is a
fourth terminal, David, which transmits x-packets d1,d2, received by Alice/Bob, but not Calvin
or Eve. Although d1,d2 are known to David, now Alice/Bob can create two combinations of
c1,c2,d1,d2 (e.g., c1+d1,c2+d2) and create two extra y-packets unknown to Calvin, David,
and Eve.
2.3.2 Secret Construction
Terminals Ti and Tj construct the following number of y-packets in the privacy ampliﬁcation
phase:
Mi j =min{VE ,V1,V2, . . .Vn } , (2.1)
where:
- VE is the expected number of x-packets that are shared by terminals Ti /Tj and missed
by Eve.
- Vl is the number of x-packets shared by terminals Ti /Tj and missed by terminal Tl .
We compute VE as
∑n
r=1UrE , whereUrE = δrE ·Ur , andUr is the number of x-packets trans-
mitted by terminal Tr and received by both terminals Ti/Tj in round r of the initial phase.
In short, we count, for each terminal and for Eve, how many of Ti /Tj ’s shared x-packets this
terminal/Eve has missed (or is expected to have missed, in Eve’s case), and we set Mi j to the
smallest of these numbers.
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It is straightforward to adapt this computation to the scenario where up to some number of
terminals collude to learn Si j , but we do not consider this scenario here.
Terminals Ti and Tj construct the y-packets using simple constructions based on Maximum
Distance Separable (MDS) codes [64], as described in Lemma 7 in the Appendix. There is no
novelty in these constructions (they rely on standard properties of MDS codes). One such
property is that, if Eve has t packets, then each y-packet involves at least t +1 packets, which
ensures that Eve cannot reconstruct it.
2.4 Secret-agreement for Multi-hop Networks
In this section we describe a secret-agreement protocol for multi-hop networks, that builds on
the basic protocol (section 2.3) and comprises new design features. In addition to channel
noise and fading, multi-hop networks offer two more sources of packet erasures, that we aim to
exploit for creating secrets: (1) interference from simultaneous transmissions, (2) existence of
multiple paths between terminals. We design a protocol, consisting of a packet dissemination
phase followed by a feedback phase, that essentially replaces the initial phase of the basic
secret-agreement protocol. Before giving the protocol description, we illustrate its core design
concepts.
LeveragingMore Than Channel Noise
During the initial phase of the basic protocol, each terminal simply generates and transmits N
x-packets during its round. For multi-hop networks, we need a more sophisticated dissem-
ination protocol, that balances two goals: on one hand maximizing the number of random
packets between every pair of terminals, and on the other hand, minimizing the number of
packets that Eve overhears. For instance, having a terminal generate random packets and
ﬂooding the network with them does not work well, because Eve ends up overhearing most of
these packets, and thus they cannot be exploited for secrecy. We need a protocol that efﬁciently
“creates erasures”; a protocol that, ﬁrst, exploits the intrinsic opportunities that wireless multi-
hop networks offer to evoke packet erasures and, second, it does so in a way that ensures as
much as possible uncorrelated packet receptions from legitimate terminals, without requiring
unnecessarily many packet transmissions (that would yield a very low efﬁciency). We design
our packet dissemination protocol leveraging the following:
1) Channel noise and fading. Ideally, we would like the broadcast transmissions to be subject
to independent erasures across the receivers so that Eve does not receive exactly the same
packets as her close neighbors. To achieve this, in the dissemination protocol we have every
terminal in the network act as a source, to uncorrelate as much as possible the quality of
reception from a terminal’s location. Additionally, each terminal broadcasts a random packet
it generates exactly once (without re-transmissions). Note that we can do this because we do
not care which random packets terminals share, only how many.
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2) Interference from simultaneous terminal transmissions. Such interference for example
occurs in the IEEE 802.11 protocol due to the hidden terminal problem. For us this is not a
problem but a blessing in disguise: we would like our dissemination protocol to incur such
interference, yet still not decrease dramatically the number of successful receptions. We allow,
thus, the terminals to transmit simultaneously x-packets (in contrast to taking turns), at a rate
that does not impose restrictively high collisions in a unit network area.
3) Multiple paths. If there are two paths between Alice and Bob in the network, and Eve
overhears only one of them, then if Alice sends packet x1 on one path and x2 on the other, Eve
will receive only one of the two packets. In general, if Alice and Bob are connected with ν paths,
while Eve can overhear at most z < ν of these (any z), it is optimal for the key generation rate if
Alice sends to Bob a different packet through each path: Alice and Bob will share ν packets
and Eve will learn only z of them [24]. To achieve this, we need a dissemination protocol that
sends each packet through a single path.
2.4.1 Algorithm
Additional parameters and notation
Each terminal Ti can generate x-packets but also forward the x-packets generated by any
other terminal in the network. In the unique identiﬁer of each generated x-packet, a ﬁeld t t l
is appended describing the maximum number of times this packet can be transmitted in the
network. Whenever a terminal transmits an x-packet (either generated locally or received by
another terminal) is referred to as the sender of this packet. Each terminal transmits at rate 1λ ,
where λ is the number of its neighbors.
Packet Dissemination Phase
Each terminal Ti maintains n−1 queuesQi j , j = i , that are empty in the beginning, and it
records all overheard trafﬁc. The packet dissemination is performed as follows:
1. Each terminal Ti generates and transmits N x-packets; it waits a random time between
transmissions so that on average it transmits at rate 1λ .
2. Upon reception of an x-packet p, the receiver checks if this is ﬁrst time it received this
packet; if yes, the receiver unicasts an acknowledgment to the sender, otherwise it does
not acknowledge.
3. The sender of a packet p selects a forwarder: LetRp denote the set of terminals that
acknowledged p. The sender chooses a terminal uniformly at random fromRp , and
unicasts a control message to inform the node it is the selected forwarder. IfRp =,
then p is not forwarded anymore.
4. The selected forwarder of a packet p (the next sender of p), reduces the t t l ﬁeld by one
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and transmits it.
Steps 2 to 4 are repeated till the t t l ﬁeld of all the packets in the network expires. Note that
when transmitting a packet p the sender sets a timer Tp , which deﬁnes a time window for
acknowledging. Once Tp has expired, step 3 takes place.
Feedback Phase
For i = 1. . .n:
1. Ti constructs a 1×nN vector vi , with a “1” in the jmth position if Ti has received the
packet with sequence number m from terminal Tj , and a “0” otherwise.
2. Ti reliably broadcasts vi into the network, using special packets indicated as feedback
packets.
3. Each terminal Tj adds to queueQ j i the identities and contents of the x-packets it shares
with terminal Ti = j .
Privacy Ampliﬁcation Phase
The terminals perform the privacy ampliﬁcation phase as described in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Each pair of terminals Ti /Tj can construct up to Mi j y-packets, the concatenation of which is
their common secret Si j . Regarding the value of variable VE in Equation 2.1, see section 2.5.2.
Key Points
The t t l determines how far a packet will propagate; thus it enables to control the trade-off
between creating a large number of common packets between nodes, while keeping Eve’s
chances of overhearing low. Each terminal acts as source, so that we generate uniform trafﬁc
across the network, and make packet receptions spatially uncorrelated. Terminals transmit
at random intervals to incur collisions and at rate 1λ so that, as the density of the network
increases, we do not cause congestion. By selecting a single forwarder we avoid ﬂooding and
exponential replication of packets; instead, each packet follows a single random walk through
the network, so that we exploit multi-path erasures. Note also that the dissemination of a
packet may stop early, becauseRp may not contain receivers due to lost or late acknowledg-
ments, or because the control message that selects a forwarder is not received. As our protocol
does not aim to deliver speciﬁc messages but instead to create shared x-packets, such losses
do not have a signiﬁcant effect.
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2.4.2 Communication Overhead Analysis
In certain steps of the secret-agreement protocol, each terminal needs to reliably broadcast an
amount of information to other terminals, notably at (1) step 2 of the feedback phase, (2) step
2 of the privacy ampliﬁcation phase. The additional communication overhead imposed by
these operations varies, depending on the way we choose to implement them.
For the feedback phase, we assume that we use an efﬁcient all-to-all broadcast dissemination
scheme; indeed, many such schemes have been explored in the literature [60, 41]. In section
2.7.2, we evaluate the secrecy rate achieved by our protocol taking into account only the
overhead of the packet dissemination phase; we do not take, thus, into account the overhead
of the feedback phase that would depend on the particular all-to-all scheme employed. To
approximately estimate how much this overhead could reduce our secrecy generation rate, we
next perform a back of the envelope calculation.
For the dissemination step there are Td  n/λ× (NL logq × t t l ) bits transmitted in total5,
with λ here denoting the average number of neighbors. For the feedback step we have Tf 
n[γ(n−1)+1]×nN bits, where 0≤ γ≤ 1, denoting a forwarding factor for each terminal, that
depends on the broadcast protocol used. Thus, our secrecy rate would be approximately
reduced by a constant factor of 1+μ, where μ is deﬁned as follows:
μ= Tf
Td
 λ× [γ(n−1)+1]×n
L logq× t t l (2.2)
Example: Assume a k-hop network with k = 3 and n = 90 in which we disseminate x-packets
of size 1KB and t t l = 3, during the dissemination step. In addition, assume we use a network
coding technique as described in [41] for the feedback step, for which γ= 2/λ yields an almost
100% packet delivery ratio. In that case, μ 0.67 meaning that the achieved rate should be
divided by a factor of 1+μ= 1.67. For the same network and for n = 135, the rate should be
divided by a factor of 1+1.51= 2.51.
In the privacy ampliﬁcation phase, a terminal Ti needs to communicate to terminal Tj the
coefﬁcients it used for constructing the y-packets, i.e., their shared secret Si j . Depending on
how the terminals intend to use this Si j , this operation could be carried out without adding
any communication overhead at all. For instance, if Ti usesSi j as an one-time-pad encryption
key to send a conﬁdential message to Tj , these coefﬁcients can be appended at the end of the
encrypted message itself. Or, the terminals could just use the same deterministic algorithm,
e.g., using as input the unique ids of the two terminals, to compute independently the same
MDS matrix A (see Lemma 7 in Appendix A.1); in that case no further communication is
needed.
5We do not account for re-transmissions, since we assume a MAC layer where re-transmissions are by default
disabled in broadcast mode, as in IEEE 802.11.
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2.5 Protocol Analysis
2.5.1 Single-hop Networks
We state, in the following, certain properties of the basic protocol and also present an argument
on why this particular protocol outperforms a more obvious alternative. We summarize
the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 4 in Appendix A.1. We omit the proof of Lemma 2, which is
straightforward.
Lemma 1. If the theoretical network conditions hold, there exists a sufﬁciently large N for
which the basic protocol is information-theoretically secure against a passive adversary.
From the previous lemma, our protocol is secure; next we examine what efﬁciency it can
achieve. Note that while for n = 2, we create a single key S with some efﬁciency E , for n ≥ 3,
the efﬁciency is different for each secret Si j , and depends on the erasure probabilities δr i , δr j ,
and δrE . In our notation, the efﬁciency simply corresponds to the ratio
Ei j =
Mi j
Nn
.
To calculate it, we need Mi j , to count how many packets a queue contains that Eve (or
eavesdropping terminals) have not received. Over the theoretical network conditions, we can
estimate Mi j using expected values. Lemma 8 in the Appendix provides concentration results
showing that our estimation error becomes zero exponentially fast in the number of packets
N . Lemma 2 provides such an example calculation.
Lemma 2. If the theoretical network conditions hold, and we assume non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers, then there exists a sufﬁciently large N for which the basic protocol achieves:
• n = 2 terminals, E = δE (1−δ),
• n ≥ 3, if δ1 ≤ δi j ≤ δ2 ∀ i , j and δE =mini δiE ,
Ei j ≥min
{
δE (1−δ2)
[
(1−δ2)+ 2δ2
n
]
,
δ1(1−δ2)
[
(1−δ2)− 1−3δ2
n
]}
.
This lemma veriﬁes an intuitive fact: as the number of terminals (and transmission rounds in
the initial phase) n increases, what dominates the size of each queue is the number of packets
(1−δ2)2N jointly overhead by two terminals; the fraction of these (δ1 or δE ) that is unknown
to our strongest eavesdropper equals the amount of secrecy we can create. In other words, the
fact that we keep adding x-packets in each queue during all rounds is the key in the protocol’s
scalability.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Lemma 2, for n = 2 terminals, the basic protocol achieves
maximum efﬁciency.
19
Chapter 2. Secret-agreement Protocols
Indeed, the efﬁciency we achieve for n = 2 reaches Maurer’s upper bound [67].
The basic protocol scales well with the number of terminals because we try to leverage broad-
casting as much as possible. If we were, instead, attempting pairwise secret establishment,
the efﬁciency would quickly go to 0 with the number of terminals. To see this, consider the
following, conceptually simpler alternative to the basic protocol: Consider a time-division
protocol, where we operate in time-slots, and at each time-slot we create the key Si j between
a speciﬁc terminal pair, using the best possible protocol that achieves efﬁciency δE (1−δ) [67].
Since we have
(n
2
)
keys to create, and each key is created during only one time-slot, the overall
efﬁciency is E (alt) = δE (1−δ)(n2) per key. Unlike the efﬁciency of our protocol that converges to a
constant value as n increases, E (alt) goes to zero.
Finally, the most demanding operations a terminal needs to perform is linear combining to
create the y-packets. Thus:
Lemma 4. Each terminal that participates in the basic protocol executes an algorithm that is
polynomial in N and n.
2.5.2 Multi-hop Networks
In contrast to the single-hopnetwork scenario, where the erasure channelmodel is well deﬁned
and allows us to do closed-form computations, the multi-hop wireless networks do not offer
this opportunity. The existence of correlated events and non-independent conditions make
the task of upper-bounding Eve’s reception capabilities very difﬁcult. In fact, the probability
of Eve (or any other terminal) receiving an x-packet depends on a multitude of effects, e.g.,
the various channel erasure probabilities, the probability of collision, the probability of the
x-packet traveling though a speciﬁc path etc. This fact hinders us from calculating closed-
form expressions about the efﬁciency achieved by our protocol, in the case of an arbitrary,
multi-hop network.
Nevertheless, the property of information-theoretic security of our protocol holds also for
the case of multi-hop networks, provided that an upper bound on the information that Eve
can receive exists. Recall that (see Eq. 2.1) terminals Ti /Tj can construct up to Mi j y-packets
that are information-theoretically secure (following Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1), and serve
as their common secret Si j , provided they know (1) Vl , i.e., the number of x-packets they
share and were missed by terminal Tl , and (2) VE , i.e., the number of x-packets they share
and were missed by Eve. The value of Vl can be precisely computed, given that each terminal
announces the x-packets it has received during the feedback phase. A lower bound for VE can
also be precisely computed, provided that an upper bound on Eve’s reception capability exists
and is known to terminals Ti /Tj .
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2.6 Adapting to Real Networks
In this section, we adapt our secret-agreement protocols to the scenario where the theoretical
network conditions (as deﬁned in section 2.2) do not hold, and an upper bound of how much
information Eve knows is not known (for the reasons explained in section 2.5.2).
The challenge with real networks is that we do not know the size of the pairwise secrets (the
Mi j from section 2.3.2) that we should create. In section 2.3.2, we were able to analytically
compute Mi j because we assumed that we knew enough about Eve’s reception capabilities to
compute the expected amount of information missed by Eve, but in a real wireless network
this knowledge cannot be assumed with certainty. Instead, we try in practice to conservatively
estimate the amount of informationmissed by Eve based on the amount of informationmissed
by the terminals.
Main Idea
In the case of single-hop networks and the basic protocol we think as follows: Alice and Bob
assume that, during each round of the initial phase, Eve learns as much information as any of
the other terminals about the x-packets shared by Alice/Bob. Hence, at the end of the initial
phase, Eve is assumed to know at least as many of the Alice/Bob shared x-packets as the most
knowledgeable terminal.
We chose this based on the following observations: Channel behavior varies signiﬁcantly over
time, to the point where we cannot estimate or even upper-bound how much information Eve
collects during one experiment based on how much information she collected during past
experiments. Channel behavior also varies over space, but less so: if, during an experiment,
terminal Ti receives many packets in common with neighbor Tj , then Ti most likely receives
many packets in common with its other neighbors as well. It turns out that, by measuring how
many packets each pair of neighboring terminals receive in common during one experiment,
we can estimate quite accurately how many packets any terminal and Eve receive in common
in the same experiment. This, of course, is an empirical estimation, thus we cannot guarantee
its accuracy theoretically.
In the case ofmulti-hop networks our intuition is that the fraction of packets, out of the packets
shared between a pair Ti /Tj , that was overheard by Eve, depends on how “far from each other”
the pair of nodes are: nodes that are further apart may collect less common packets; yet among
the packets they collect, Eve is likely to have overheard a smaller amount, since she would
not intercept the transmissions in all paths that connect them. In addition, Eve will aim to
position herself inside the network so as to maximize her probability of eavesdropping as
many paths as possible, i.e., a position through which the majority of the available paths pass
by.
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Estimating Eve’s Knowledge
Single-hop networks: Ti and Tj estimate that, at the end of the initial phase, from their
shared x-packets, Eve misses the following number:
VE =
n∑
r =i , j , r=1
min{V r1 ,V
r
2 , . . .V
r
n }, (2.3)
where V rl is the number of new x-packets shared by terminals Ti /Tj and missed by terminal
Tl during round r of the initial phase.
In short, we assume that, in each round of the initial phase, Eve missed as few (of the x-packets
newly shared by Ti /Tj in this round) as any other terminal.
Multi-hop networks: We form a setL of the  nodes that have the largest number of neigh-
bors. Let ki j be the distance between nodes Ti /Tj in hops and letP(ki j ) denote the set of all
pairs of terminals in the network with the same distance ki j . Then:
VE = avg
P(ki j )
min
∈L
{V p1 ,V
p
2 , . . .V
p
l }, (2.4)
where V pl is the number of x-packets shared by pair p, with p ∈P(ki j ), and missed by helper
terminal Tl , and avgP(ki j ) denotes average taken over the setP(ki j ).
In the above formula we select the  nodes with most neighbors to be conservative (note that
the larger the L the more conservative we are); we also calculate the average taken over all
pairs with distance ki j , because a similar behavior is expected from pairs at the same distance.
Key Points
If we do not assume theoretical network conditions, in the case of singe-hop, or the existence
of an upper-bound of how much Eve learns, in the case of multi-hop, we cannot offer formal
guarantees about the reliability of our protocol, because we do not know exactly how much
information Eve collects during the initial phase (resp. the packet dissemination phase): it is
theoretically possible that Eve receives more x-packets in common with the terminals than we
estimate, which means that she learns something about the pairwise secrets. The amount of
information that leaks to Eve depends both on the particular wireless network and the number
of terminals we use for our estimations: the more terminals we use, the more we learn about
the quality of receptions throughout the network, and the better we can estimate the quality
of Eve’s receptions capabilities. Hence, the amount of information that leaks to Eve needs to
be experimentally assessed in each wireless network.
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2.7 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate our adapted secret-agreement protocols (sec-
tion 2.6). Our goal is to answer two questions: is it feasible to achieve non-negligible secrecy
rate in realistic wireless setups by leveraging packet erasures? And how well can we do so using
our protocols?
2.7.1 Single-hop Networks
Testbed
We show our testbed in Figure 2.1. It consists of 6 nodes distributed over an indoor ofﬁce area.
Each ofﬁce is about 2×3 meters. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the nodes are HTC Wildﬁre An-
droid smartphones. We set the phones to 802.11 ad-hoc mode, and we ﬁxed their transmission
rate to 36 Mbps. In some experiments, we also use WARP software-deﬁned radios [10].
In order for our approach to work, the wireless network must provide a certain level of channel
variability. The simplest scenario where such variability exists is when the nodes are not in
direct line of sight, e.g., they are separated by ofﬁce walls. This is the scenario we implement
in our testbed. Our protocol can work even when the nodes are in direct line of sight, but for
that we need to use artiﬁcial noise (the terminals create interference and force Eve to miss
some of the trafﬁc they exchange). We have experimented with that idea [85], but we do not
consider this approach here.
When we refer to an “experiment,” we mean that we place one node in each room, and we run
one round of our protocol. In each experiment, one node plays the role of Eve, while the rest
play the role of 5 terminals that exchange pairwise secrets. There are 6 possible arrangements
of 5 terminals and Eve in 6 rooms, and we experiment with 3 different levels of transmit power.
Hence, each presented graph summarizes the results of 3×6 experiments (all the combinations
of transmit-power levels and node arrangements). For each transmit power level, we use a
box plot as a convenient way of graphically depicting different groups of our measurements
through their percentiles (we used matlab’s boxplot function [66]): On each box, the central
horizontal line is the median, i.e., half of the measurements are below that level and the other
half is above. The lower edge of the box is the 25th percentile (splits off the lowest 25% of
measurements from the highest 75%) and the upper edge is the 75th percentile (splits off the
lowest 75% of measurements from the highest 25%). The whiskers extend to the most extreme
measurements not considered outliers6, and outliers are plotted individually and marked as +.
6In matlab’s implementation, points are considered as outliers if they are larger than q3+w(q3−q1) or smaller
than q1−w(q3−q1), where q1 and q3 are the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. The default value of w is 1.5
and corresponds to approximately ±2.7σ and 99.3 coverage if the data are normally distributed.
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Figure 2.1 – Our 1-hop wireless testbed.
Ideal Secrecy Rate
We start with the ideal efﬁciency and secrecy rate achievable in this testbed by leveraging
packet erasures. In particular, we measure the efﬁciency and secrecy rate of an oracle-assisted
protocol; this works like ours, with the only difference that it does not estimate how much
information Eve obtains in the initial phase – that knowledge is directly provided by the oracle.
More speciﬁcally, instead of estimating VE using Equation 2.3, we set it to the exact number
of x-packets shared by terminals Ti/Tj and missed by Eve. This oracle-assisted protocol
by construction achieves reliability 1, because it knows exactly how much information Eve
obtains in the initial phase and computes the longest secret that is completely unknown to
Eve. In Figure 2.2 (“Ideal” label) we plot the efﬁciency/secrecy rate achieved by any terminal
pair in any experiment, using the oracle-assisted protocol, as a function of the transmit power
of the terminals.
First, we see that, if we perfectly knew Eve’s channel conditions, all terminal pairs could
create tens of thousands of secret bits per second, of which Eve would have zero information
independently from her computational capabilities. This shows that a real wireless network
may offer enough channel variability to enable secret generation in non-negligible rates.
Second, we observe a variability regarding the secrecy rates achieved by different pairs of
terminals, which reduces as the transmit power increases. This is because for low transmit
powers the difference in physical distance between terminal pairs has a greater impact on the
terminals’ channel qualities than for high powers; as the transmit power increases the channel
noise affects in a similar way the terminals’ channel qualities, despite their differences in
physical distance.
Third, we see that the secrecy rate drops as the transmit power of the terminals increases.
This is due to the following reason: As the transmit power of a terminal increases, so does
the quality of its channels to both the other terminals and Eve. Hence, higher transmit power
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Figure 2.2 – Efﬁciency and secrecy rate as a function of TX power. “Ideal” corresponds to the
oracle-assisted protocol and “Effective” to our protocol.
means that the terminals receive correctly more packets, but also that Eve overhears more of
their packets, decreasing, thus, their secrecy rate.
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Figure 2.3 – Reliability of our protocol as a function of TX power.
Reliability and Secrecy Rate of our Protocol
Next, we look at the performance of our protocol. Unlike the oracle-assisted protocol, ours
needs to estimate how much information Eve obtains in the initial phase. If it overestimates
Eve’s knowledge, it creates a shorter secret than it could, achieving lower efﬁciency/secrecy
rate than the oracle-assisted protocol. If it underestimates Eve’s knowledge, it creates a longer
25
Chapter 2. Secret-agreement Protocols
secret than it should, achieving higher secrecy rate than the oracle-assisted protocol, but
reliability below 1. Hence, there is a trade-off between secrecy rate (how fast we create new
secrets) and reliability (how secure these secrets are).
Ideally, we would want our protocol to behave like the oracle-assisted one (achieve the same
secrecy rate and reliability 1). In practice, this is infeasible, as it would require us to always
estimate Eve’s knowledge with perfect accuracy. Thankfully, it is also unnecessary: Suppose a
secret has reliability 0.6, which means that Eve can correctly guess the value of one bit of the
secret with probability 2−0.6 = 0.66. The smallest secret that our protocol ever creates is one
y-packet (1 KB); reliability 0.6 means that Eve can correctly guess the value of one y-packet
with probability 2−0.6·8000 ≈ 0. Hence, as long as the terminals use their pairwise secrets at the
granularity of a y-packet (e.g., they use at least one entire y-packet as an encryption key), they
are secure from Eve.
Figure 2.2 (“Effective” label) and Figure 2.3 show the efﬁciency/secrecy rate and the reliability
of our protocol, as a function of the transmit power of the terminals. We see that, using
our estimations, we can closely follow the behavior of Eve. Although we tend to slightly
underestimate Eve’s knowledge as the transmit power increases, on average the secrets we
create have reliability above 0.8. This shows that, in a real wireless network, it may be feasible
to accurately estimate an adversary’s knowledge, if we have a sufﬁciently dense deployment
of collaborating honest nodes. Of course, this estimation will become harder as we consider
adversaries with increasingly more sophisticated hardware (e.g., multiple receiving antennas).
Finally, we note that we could increase further the reliability of our secrets by decreasing Mi j ,
the number of y-packets that a terminal pair Ti /Tj can construct, by a constant factor φ. This
would, of course decrease the efﬁciency/rate achieved by the terminals by the same factor.
For example, we used φ= 2 in our experiments, which translated to half the rate reported in
Figure 2.2, but also to a reliability almost (with very few outliers close to 0.7) at 1 for all the
produced secrets Si j .
Understanding Erasures
In the above experiments, Eve uses a commodity device, i.e., a smartphone, to eavesdrop the
communication medium; she, therefore, gains knowledge only from the information that is
successfully delivered to her application layer. There exist packets that reach Eve’s receiver,
yet are not delivered to her application because they are corrupted beyond what the lower
layers can repair. One could argue that, if Eve rooted her phone and gained access to every
packet that reaches her physical layer (even the partially corrupted ones), she would improve
her knowledge.
To investigate how much Eve’s knowledge could be improved, we used three WARP software-
deﬁned radios7, conﬁgured with an 802.11-compliant physical layer (16 QAM over OFDM),
7The smartphones used for our earlier experiments do not provide access to received data that is discarded
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Figure 2.4 – Eve’s conditional entropy (in bits per channel use) when she has access to the
packets that reach her receiver. In our setup, one “channel use” means sending one 16 QAM
symbol. “Correction” corresponds to the case where an oracle corrects all corrupted packets
that reach Eve.
and we placed them in our testbed. We make one of them (Alice) send out trafﬁc, while the
other two (Bob and Eve) receive. The difference from our earlier experiments is that now Eve
tries to use all the packets that reach her physical layer (every correctly received packet but
also every packet with partially corrupted payload – that would be normally dropped below
the application layer, if Eve was using a smartphone) to increase her knowledge. First, we
consider the packets that are correctly received by Bob, and we measure Eve’s knowledge
(conditional entropy) about these packets8. Then we repeat the experiment, assuming that
an oracle magically repairs the corrupted payload of every packet that reaches Eve’s receiver.
In the former case, Eve’s uncertainty on Bob’s information originates from both corrupted
and erased symbols – this is equivalent to Eve using a smartphone, whereas in the latter only
from erased ones (that do not reach Eve’s receiver at all) – this is equivalent to Eve using a
specialized radio receiver and to gaining the maximum possible knowledge out of partially
corrupted packets.
Figure 2.4 shows that – at least in our testbed – Eve’s uncertainty mostly depends on the erased
in-the-air symbols, i.e., symbols that were not demodulated at all. We observe that, if Alice
uses transmit powers of 10, 15 and 20 dBm, in the second experiment (where all payload
corruption is corrected by the oracle), Eve learns only an extra 0.2, 0.15 and 0.08 bit-per-
channel-use, respectively, relative to the ﬁrst experiment. This indicates that the number
of partially corrupted packets that reach Eve’s receiver is relatively small, hence they do not
signiﬁcantly increase Eve’s knowledge (or reduce the secrecy rate achieved by our protocol).
below the application layer.
8We do so by calculating the joint empirical distribution of the 16-QAM symbols in the payload of Bob’s packets
and the symbols that Eve receives – correctly or not.
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2.7.2 Multi-hop Networks
Simulation Environment
We use the Java-based, discrete event-driven simulator JiST [18], along with the SWANS
library [19], that builds on top of JiST and provides all the elements needed to simulate ad-hoc
wireless networks. We also used the extensions and bug-ﬁxes proposed in [57]. In Table 2.4 we
summarize the conﬁguration parameters of the simulation setup. We use an IEEE 802.11b/g
compliant MAC conﬁguration and an SNR frame reception model with an SNR threshold value
appropriate for high data rates [79]. The RTS/CTS functionality is by default disabled.
The signal interference model used in the JiST/SWANS simulator is equivalent to the physical
model of successful receptions as deﬁned by Gupta et al. in [48]. This feature enables to
simulate the hidden-terminal effect and exploit collisions and frame erasures for secrecy.
We simulate a wireless ad-hoc network as a set of n nodes uniformly at random placed on a
square area of dimension x meters. All nodes have the same communication capabilities that
yield a transmission range of r meters. Under the conﬁguration parameters described above
r ≈ 200m. Therefore, for a k-hop network we set x = k ∗ r
2
. We consider networks with ﬁxed
network density per unit area, that is, for a k-hop area and a given density d we have in total
n = k2∗d nodes.
In our protocol, we set t t l = k, the maximum distance in the network, and the packet payload
to 1KB, so that the resulting MAC frame (including the necessary headers of our protocol and
of other layers) does not get fragmented. We also position Eve in each conﬁguration to be in
the network center, where we veriﬁed that she would have the highest probability to overhear
the largest amount of packets. We also veriﬁed that the simulator produces very similar results,
in the case of a single-hop network, to these produced in our testbed.
Ideal Secrecy Rate
As in the case of single-hop, we measure the efﬁciency/secrecy generation rate achieved by
the oracle-assisted protocol. Figures 2.5a, 2.6a, 2.7a (label “Ideal”) show the efﬁciency/rate
achieved by the oracle alternative, over k-hop networks, with k = 1. . .5, and for network
densities d = 10, 15, 20, respectively.
First, we observed that in all cases we simulated, we could generate non-zero rates across
(almost) all pairs in the network. Notably, we observed that in all our simulations, only 56
pairs of nodes in total experienced zero rate (in particular conﬁgurations of 500 nodes, where
in each conﬁguration there exist 124750 possible pairs). Second, for every density, we observe
that, as the size of the network increases, namely for k ≥ 3, the rate signiﬁcantly drops. This is
the aggregated result of two conﬂicting effects: (1) to create shared randomness over a k-hop
network, each packet needs to be transmitted at least k times, which correspondingly reduces
the rate; moreover the amount of common packets that a pair of terminals collects during
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MAC Layer Slot Time 20μs
Wmin 31 slots
Wmax 1023 slots
SIFS 10μs
DIFS 50 μs
PHY header 192 bits
MAC header 272 bits
DATA frame header 464 bits
ACK frame 304 bits
PHY Layer Frequency 2.4 GHz
Basic Rate 1 Mbps
Data Rate 36 Mbps
Tx Power 15 dBm
Sensitivity Threshold -81 dBm
Reception Threshold -71 dBm
Reception Model SNR
SNR Threshold 15 dB
Channel Model Propagation Model TwoRay
Fading Model Rayleigh
Interference Model AdditiveNoise
Table 2.4 – Conﬁguration of simulation setup.
the packet dissemination phase is smaller, because a smaller percentage of the generated
packets reaches both, which in turn reduces the rate; (2) due to the existence of interference
and multiple paths between two terminals in larger networks, Eve observes a smaller fraction
of the common random packets that both terminals collect, which boosts the rate. We veriﬁed
these effects in our simulations; we show here in Fig. 2.8 the second effect: we examine what
percentage of packets shared between two nodes Eve has also observed (on average), and we
ﬁnd that this percentage decreases with the network size. Finally, for the 2-hop network, we
observe that as the density increases, the rate also increases; this is because we have more
nodes acting as sources, thus creating more interference and hindering Eve from collecting
the same packets as her close neighbors. The existence of multiple paths, boosts further the
rate, as demonstrated by the rates for a 2-hop network when comparing to the rate for an
1-hop network, for high network densities: the more nodes we have the more probable is that
two nodes are connected through more than one paths, out of which Eve does not observe at
least one.
Reliability and Secrecy Rate of our Protocol
Fig. 2.5a, 2.6a, 2.7a (label “Effective”) demonstrate the efﬁciency/rate achieved by our protocol,
and Fig. 2.5b, 2.6b, 2.7b the corresponding achieved reliability. In contrast to the oracle-
assisted protocol, in our protocol the terminals need to estimate how many packets Eve
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Figure 2.5 – Measurements for network density d = 10, over arbitrary k-hop networks.
misses, using the technique in section 2.6.
We observe that our protocol can closely follow the oracle-assisted protocol’s performance, i.e.,
our estimator yields rather accurate estimations on Eve’s knowledge. In some cases, namely
for small densities and small networks, i.e., k ≤ 2, we underestimate Eve’s knowledge, which
yields reliability values around 0.7. Despite this, we observe that as the network increases in
density and size, the terminals compute very good estimations; this is of course due to the
fact that the more terminals there exist, the more side information on packet receptions is
available, the easier it becomes to accurately estimate a terminal’s (Eve’s) behavior.
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Figure 2.6 – Measurements for network density d = 15, over arbitrary k-hop networks.
2.8 Discussion
A main assumption we do is that Eve is a passive adversary. In the case that Eve is an active
adversary (tries to impersonate a terminal), the terminals need to share some bootstrap
information to authenticate each other when they ﬁrst communicate. The need for this
bootstrap information is fundamentally unavoidable: without it, there is no way for Alice
to know she is talking to Bob until they have established their ﬁrst secret. Authentication is
orthogonal to our secret agreement and can happen in different ways, e.g., by requiring the
terminals to initially share bootstrap information and use it to construct authentication codes
for the x-packets (and the feedback packets) they transmit the ﬁrst time they run our protocols.
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Figure 2.7 – Measurements for network density d = 20, over arbitrary k-hop networks.
After the terminals have established their ﬁrst pairwise secrets using our protocols, they can
use these to construct new authentication codes, which do not depend on the bootstrap
information.
One might argue: if the terminals have to share bootstrap information anyway to defend
against active adversaries, they might as well share pairwise secrets to begin with and not run
our protocol at all. The advantage of our protocols is that they enable the terminals to keep
generating new secrets, independent from the previous ones, and continuously refresh their
encryption and authentication keys. Unless the adversary can break into one of the terminals
while they run our protocols, she has a small window of opportunity to compromise their
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Figure 2.8 – Eve’s knowledge on shared packets.
communication: she has to steal the bootstrap information and impersonate a terminal while
the terminals are running our protocols for the ﬁrst time.
2.9 RelatedWork
Existing information theoretical results characterize the largest achievable secrecy rate under
a variety of idealized channel models [98, 67, 37, 39]. The most common setting considers
pairwise secret key generation over a single channel with a single sender and one or more
receivers. Some results are available for a network setting, most notably secure network coding
for an error-free wired network [24]. The secrecy capacity of wireless erasure networks is
investigated in [69], but no complete characterization is provided. A rich literature exists in
designing practical codes for achieving the theoretical secrecy bounds (see [50] and references
therein), but the proposed schemes typically aim in providing weak information theoretic
security and in single message delivery (e.g., [14, 74, 49, 56]). Coding for strong secrecy usually
yields low achievable rates and builds on the fact that Eve has a degraded channel compared
to the legitimate nodes [50].
Several practical protocols were recently also proposed that build on the symmetry and the
randomness extracted from the wireless channel to set up strong information theoretically
secure pairwise keys [100, 62, 80, 17, 99]. These achieve modest secret-generation rates (in
modiﬁed 802.11 or 802.15 environments) and require node proximity, hence, they do not
naturally translate to multi-hop networks/multiple keys creation. iJam [43] utilizes artiﬁcial in-
terference (speciﬁc to OFDM) to increase Eve’s uncertainty and it achieves a secret-generation
rate up to 18 Kbps (in a modiﬁed 802.11).
We differ in the following ways: to the best of our knowledge, our work is the ﬁrst to consider
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multi-terminal pairwise secret-agreement, where broadcast is leveraged to efﬁciently create
multiple shared secrets at the same time. The existing protocols focus on a single pair of
nodes, hence they are not designed to leverage broadcast, and they would not scale well with
the number of terminals (if applied to the multi-terminal scenario). Moreover, our protocols
achieve a secret-generation rate of tens of Kbps, without requiring any custom physical-layer
operations that are speciﬁc to OFDM (or any other transmission scheme). More importantly,
as noted earlier, the extension for a multi-hop network requires new techniques and also
brings new secrecy opportunities. To our best knowledge the current work is the ﬁrst to
develop protocols for secret key exchange in a multi-hop network that simultaneously exploits
channel and network properties, and to report secrecy rates of Kbps, through experimentation
in realistic wireless setups.
2.10 Summary
In this chapter we presented two protocols for enabling a group of n wireless nodes to create
pairwise secrets, in the presence of a passive adversary, with limited network presence, without
assuming anything about her computational and memory capabilities. Our basic secret-
agreement protocol operates in single-hop networks, it is information-theoretically secure
and leverages broadcast to create secrets simultaneously between all terminal pairs. Our
protocol for arbitrary, multi-hop networks, builds on the basic protocol and includes new
designs, e.g., a custom packet dissemination protocol, to leverage the beneﬁts of multi-hop
for secrecy generation.
On the practical side, we evaluated our protocols through testbed experimentation and exten-
sive simulations, and we showed that it is feasible to generate secrets at non-negligible rates,
both on single-hop and multi-hop networks.
In summary, the contributions in this chapter are:
1. We design practical secret-agreement protocols for simultaneously generating
(n
2
)
se-
crets in:
a) single-hop networks, by leveraging channel properties,
b) arbitrary multi-hop networks, by leveraging both channel and network properties.
2. We evaluate the performance of our protocols through experimentation in realistic
wireless environments.
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3 A Tor-like Trafﬁc Anonymization
Scheme
3.1 Introduction
The Tor anonymity network [38] is an overlay network that combines Onion Routing with a
lightweight system design for Internet trafﬁc anonymization, and it is rapidly becoming the
prevalent approach to anonymity today. In the core of the Tor system, basic cryptographic
primitives are used, e.g., the Difﬁe-Hellman key-agreement, RSA and AES encryption. In
this chapter we aim in designing an alternative, Tor-like communication scheme for wireless
networks, that offers a level of anonymity comparable to the level of anonymity that Tor
does, yet without assuming anything about the computational and memory capabilities of an
adversary, who is trying to de-anonymize the observed trafﬁc in the network.
Similarly to the Tor anonymity approach, our goal is to enable nodes to connect to the Internet,
while hiding their identity within a set of potential users. Tor achieves anonymity by bouncing
encrypted communications around a distributed network of relays; we similarly bounce
encrypted communications among the wireless network nodes. In our use-case scenario, an
information packet travels from the source node along a randomly selected path towards a
ﬁnal hop to the Internet. We use layered, one-time pad encryption to both secure the messages
against eavesdropping, and ensure that each relay along the path is aware of only a fraction of
the entire communication path, in a fashion similar to Tor.
The main contribution of this chapter is in the design of a trafﬁc anonymization protocol,
that exploits the security properties of the shared secrets, which we can generate with the
techniques described in chapter 2. Our privacy analysis demonstrates that we can achieve
a Tor-like level of anonymity and our experimental evaluation shows that we can achieve
almost perfect anonymity within a group of approximately half the network size. We note that
the trafﬁc anonymization protocol presented in this chapter is not bounded to the speciﬁc
secret-generation technique we described in chapter 2. Any secret-agreement procedure,
that enables nodes in a multi-hop wireless network to establish secure pairwise and group
keys, under the presence of an adversary, would serve as the base of our trafﬁc anonymization
protocol.
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The work presented in this chapter has been presented in [83].
3.2 Setup and Background
System and AdversaryModel
We consider a network of n wireless nodes that form a k-hop ad-hoc network, where k refers
to the maximum distance (in hops) between any two nodes. From the nature of wireless,
each node’s transmission can potentially be received by its neighbors, i.e., all nodes within
its transmission radius. We assume that every node has a unique identiﬁer that is revealed
to all other nodes in the network. We also assume that every node is an honest-but-curious
node: it legitimately participates in the protocols used, but tries to breach security using the
information at its disposal.
In the network there exists also a passive adversary, Eve, who eavesdrops but does not reveal
her presence with any form of communication, and can be located anywhere inside the
network, at an unknown location. We assume that Eve has access to the same physical layer
(radio technology, number of antennas etc.) as the legitimate nodes, and is not omni-present
in the network. However, we assume that Eve may have inﬁnite memory as well as unbounded
computational capabilities at her disposal; this would follow the model of an adversary that
does not want to reveal her identity by using specialized equipment, yet has ofﬂine access
to unbounded resources to breach security. In the following we will call the adversary Eve,
without specifying (unless needed) if she is a passive eavesdropper or an honest-but-curious
node.
Possible Use-case Scenario
As a use-case, consider a street protest, where participants use local communication (e.g. WiFi)
to cooperate and hide the identity of someone who needs to use cellular Internet connectivity
to send reports to the media (and thus might be a target for the authorities eavesdropping
the local communication). In addition to eavesdropping, the authorities might interrogate
any participant and force them to reveal their knowledge on the on-going communications.
While Tor preserves anonymity as long as the cryptographic primitives used remain unbreak-
able, we aim, with our approach, to ensure anonymity even if the adversary has unlimited
computational power.
The Basic Tor Operations
We here summarize the basic Tor [38] operations, without describing in full detail the whole
system architecture; we rather focus on the key agreement procedure and the use of the keys
for anonymous communication.
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A node S wants to send a message m to a public destination D (e.g. a web-server) using the Tor
anonymization network, i.e., a set of collaborating nodes, the so-called Onion Routers (OR),
that will relay m toward its ﬁnal destination. In a ﬁrst phase, S negotiates a symmetric key
with each relay. Assume S selects two nodes (the minimum required, assuming S is an OR as
well) R1,R2, as shown in Fig. 3.1, and agrees on two symmetric keys with each one of them:
1. S sends to R1 the ﬁrst half of the Difﬁe-Hellman handshake g x1 , encrypted with the
public key K+R1 of R1. R1 responds back with the other half of the handshake g
y1 , and
a hash of the negotiated key (with F (·) denoting a secure hash function). S and R1
compute the key KSR1 = g x1y1 .
2. S sends to R1 the packet KSR1 {R2, K
+
R2
{g x
2
}}, that is a request to negotiate a symmetric
key with R2, encrypted with the key KSR1 (128-AES encryption). R1 and R2 perform the
same actions as S and R1 respectively in step 1.
In a secondphase, S communicates amessagem toD by sending the packetKSR1 {R2, KSR2 {D,m}}
to R1, which extracts the ﬁrst layer of encryption and forwards the inner packet KSR2 {D,m} to
R2; ﬁnally, R2 extracts the second layer of encryption and sends m to D .
We note two fundamental properties of the Tor design:
• Property 1: R1 cannot compute the key KSR2 , since g
x2 is protected with the public key
of R2. It cannot, namely, decrypt the packet KSR2 {D, m} and reveal the message m and
its ﬁnal destination D .
• Property 2: R2 does not know if it is setting up a symmetric key with R1 or any other
node in the network (in our example, node S). In other words, it does not know which is
the originator of the packet KSR2 {D, m}; from R2’s perspective the originator could be
R1, S or any other network node with equal probability.
These two properties ensure the basic premise of Tor: a relay knows only two nodes along the
communication path, its predecessor and its successor, but cannot ultimately link S to D and
m. Anonymous communication is, therefore, preserved under the presence an adversary Eve,
who in this case has bounded computational power and cannot breach the security of the
cryptographic primitives used.
PerformanceMetrics
The goal of our trafﬁc anonymization protocol is to create uncertainty to Eve about the sender
and the receiver of a given message m. Let S ,D denote the random variables that describes
who the actual sender and receiver is, and E Eve’s knowledge on the protocol and the produced
trafﬁc.
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S R1 R2 D
K+R1 {g
x1 }
g y1 , F (KSR1 )
KSR1 {R2, K
+
R2
{g x2 }}
K+R2 {g
x2 }
g y2 , F (KSR2 )KSR1 {g
y2 , F (KSR2 )}
KSR1 {R2, KSR2 {D,m}} KSR2 {D, m}
m
Figure 3.1 – Tor anonymization protocol – example.
• The sender uncertainty US and destination uncertainty UD are measured as the condi-
tional entropies:
US =H(S|E) andUD =H(D|E).
• The sender-receiver uncertainty expresses the uncertainty about the communication
pair and equals
US−D =H(S|E)+H(D|E).
US−D gives the entropy of the joint distribution of (S ,D) in case the two random vari-
ables are independent from Eve’s perspective. The maximum source uncertainty within
a group would be achieved if Eve believes each group member to be the source with
equal probability.
3.3 Trafﬁc Anonymization Protocol
We here describe a communication scheme aiming to provide a level of anonymity that
is comparable with the anonymity level of the Tor system [38], albeit also secure against
computationally unbounded, but presence-limited, adversaries. The design of our protocol
aims in satisfying the two fundamental Properties 1 and 2 of Tor, that we described in section
3.2.
The steps of negotiating the symmetric keys in Tor, are essentially replaced by the secret-
generation protocol for multi-hop networks as described in chapter 2: In an initial step,
legitimate nodes produce and transmit random packets; next, they publicly announce to each
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other which packets they correctly received. In a second step, the nodes linearly combine
their common packets to create keys, on request. We now describe how they can use these
resources for anonymous communication, as depicted in Fig. 3.2.
Example
S wants to communicate message m to D :
1. S randomly selects two nodes R1 and R2 in the network that will act as relays. The
message m will travel to D by following the path S−R1−R2−D , as depicted in Figure 3.2,
where each link in this path is conceptual, i.e., the underlying connection may employ
multiple hops.
2. S uses one-time pad encryption to send to R1 the message m and the identities D and
R2 through the packet:
KSR1 {R2,KG2 {D,m}}=KSR1 ⊕ {R2,KG2 ⊕ {D,m}},
where KSR1 is a secure pairwise key between S and R1 (we will call this link encryption),
and KG2 is a random packet that all nodes in a group G2 have successfully received,
with {S,R2} ⊂G2 but R1 ∉G2, i.e., this packet is secret from R1 (we will call this group
encryption).
3. R1, that has the pairwise key KSR1 , removes it to ﬁnd out that it needs to forward to R2; it
then re-encrypts using the pairwise key KR1R2 and sends the packet:
KR1R2 {KG2 {D, m}}=KR1R2 ⊕KG2 ⊕ {D, m}.
R1 does not possess KG2 and thus does not learn D and m.
4. R2 removes both KR1R2 and KG2 , and sends m to D ; R2 does not know that S originated
message m, since it could have been any node in groupG2.
Key Points
The link and the group keys serve complimentary roles in ensuring anonymity. The role of the
link keys, KSR1 and KR1R2 , is to hide R2, D , and m from intermediate relays as well as external
eavesdroppers, similarly to the symmetric encryption in Tor. The role of the group key KG2 is
threefold. First, it hides the identity of the destination from R1, who only learns the identity of
the next relay R2. Second, because it also hides the message m from R1, even if R1 overhears
the unencrypted message m that R2 transmits, it cannot link m to packet KG2 {D,m} and thus
again will not learn the destination. Third, it hides the identity of the sender within the group
G2 for R2, who only knows that S ∈G2. In other words, the role of the group keys is to provide
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S R1 R2 D
KSR1 {R2, KG2 {D, m}}
KR1R2 {KG2 {D, m}}
m
Figure 3.2 – Trafﬁc anonymization protocol – example.
the basic anonymity property: each relay knows only its predecessor and its successor in the
communication path; similarly to Tor.
How we have created keys has signiﬁcant implications on the anonymity protocol we have
designed. Our protocol essentially combines the layered (onion) encryption of Tor with
one-time pad encryption. We can afford to use one-time encryption, exploiting the high key-
generation rates of our secret-agreement protocol for multi-hop networks; S can randomly
select R1 and R2 because we can create keys between all pairs of nodes; and because we
distribute random packets to create shared randomness, we can easily ﬁnd large setsG2 that
share common random packets (see section 3.5). The size ofG2 is important as it determines
the amount of anonymity: the larger it is, the harder it is for the adversary to correctly guess
the originator of a packet.
3.3.1 Algorithm
The protocol we described in the previous example naturally extends to multiple relays, as
described next.
1. S selects randomly t relays R1, . . . ,Rt .
2. S creates each group key KGi by randomly selecting a packet from the packet dissemina-
tion phase among the ones that (a) are not known by Ri−1, (b) are known by Ri , (c) are
known by at least σ other nodes, where the parameter σ deﬁnes the minimum size of
Gi .
3. S sends to R1 a packet of the form:
KSR1 {R2,KG2 {R3,KG3 {. . .KGt {D,m}}}}
such that {S,Ri }⊂Gi , Ri−1 ∉Gi .
4. The ﬁrst relay R1 decrypts the packet using the link key KSR1 and encrypts the encapsu-
lated packet destined for R2, using the link key KR1R2 , and sends the packet:
KR1R2 {KG2 {R3,KG3 {. . .KGt {D,m}}}}}.
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5. The relay Ri sends to Ri+1 the packet:
KRiRi+1 {KGi+1 {Ri+2,KGi+2 {. . .KGt {D,m}}}}},
which is produced as follows: (1) After removing the two outermost encryption layers
(ﬁrst with a link key KRi−1Ri and then with a group key KGi ), the received packet reveals
the next relay Ri+1 on the path and an encapsulated packet that is encrypted with KGi+1 .
(2) Ri encrypts the encapsulated packet with KRi ,Ri+1 .
6. The last relay Rt simply forwards m to D , after removing the two remaining encryption
layers.
Note that this protocol can be used to also support two-way communication: since every relay
knows the preceding relay along a path, they can forward a response from D by applying the
same type of encryptions but now in the reverse direction.
3.4 Privacy Analysis
We use the term ﬂow to describe the set of all the packets that are exchanged to support the
communication of a speciﬁc S-D pair. We are interested in four forms of unlinkability:
• Unlinkability of packets: Eve is not able to tell whether two (or more) overheard packets
belong to the same ﬂow.
• Unlinkability with the destination: Eve is not able to tell which is the destination of an
overheard packet. We measure this with the metricUD =H(D|E).
• Unlinkability with the source: Eve is not able to tell which is the source of an overheard
packet. We measure this with the metricUS =H(S|E).
• Source-Destination unlinkability: Eve does no learn which source communicates with
which destination.
Recall that for us Eve may be a passive external eavesdropper, or an honest-but-curious node
in our network.
Unlinkability of Packets
Clearly, we need to have more than one ﬂows in our network, as the uncertainty, to which
ﬂow a packet belongs, is constrained by the number of ﬂows. We will next assume that a large
number of ﬂows share the network; this is also a basic premise of Tor.
If Eve overhears a packet, she could learn which node transmitted it and which node received
it (she could learn one link of the path); if she could overhear multiple packets that she found
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were part of the same ﬂow, she could piece together parts of the path, and thus her uncertainty
about the communicating parties would reduce. Packet unlinkability is essential to avoid
giving such side information to Eve.
In our protocol, the link keys together with the group keys, ensure that all transmitted packets
are statistically independent and thus, even if Eve observes multiple of them, she cannot
correlate them. The use of link keys ensure that packets appear statistically independent of
each other whether or not they belong to the same ﬂow. This property holds also against a
relay: the content of a packet a relay can see, by knowing its own link key, is independent of
the same packet encrypted with a different link key. It means relays cannot recognize packets
that they themselves forwarded earlier along the path.
The only packet that is not protected with a link key is the last packet of the ﬂow. Hence,
it remains to protect the last message from a relay, who knows also a link key. The group
key plays a role here: it encrypts the message from relays, which makes also the last packet
independent and thus unlinkable with its previously seen encrypted version. It follows that
for all nodes (including Eve) packets remain unlinkable with each other in the network.
Unlinkability with the Destination
If Eve overhears the transmission of Rt (of the last relay on the path), then she learns the
destination of the packet, and thusUD = 0; trivially, this is the case if Eve is the node Rt . The
leakage of this information is unavoidable, since D is outside the network. This is also the case
in Tor.
If Eve overhears the transmission of any other packet, the packet remains unlinkable with its
destination. Indeed, link keys protect the identity of the destination from any node who is not
a relay on the path; and group keys protect the identity of the destination from the nodes that
are relays. It follows that for any node, including relays, the destination remains unlinkable
with any packet of the ﬂow except for the last-hop unencrypted packet.
Unlinkability with the Sender
We here need to distinguish cases depending on which node Eve is. First, assume Eve is
not one of the Ri relays on the path; then the link keys make the different packets of a ﬂow
indistinguishable, i.e., Eve cannot tell if an overheard packet is the ﬁrst packet of the ﬂow, and
cannot learn anything about the sender. Next, assume Eve is R1. Then Eve knows that S is
the source, and thus for the ﬁrst packetUS = 0. This is also the case in Tor, if the adversary
manages to compromise the ﬁrst onion-router, to which the user’s onion-proxy connects.
Assume now Eve is a relay Ri on the path. Ri knows that S ∈Gi ∩Gi+1, since the source has to
be a member of both groups. Thus it can link S with the groupGi ∩Gi+1. In the example of
Fig. 3.2, R2 learns that S ∈G2. Ideally, any node inGi ∩Gi+1 would appear equally likely to be
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the actual source, i.e., Eve would infer a uniform distribution over these nodes. However, the
selection of the groupsGi does not guarantee this property; the distribution will be skewed
from the uniform. We numerically evaluate the uncertaintyUS in the evaluation section 3.5,
and ﬁnd that it is very close to uniform.
Sender-Receiver Unlinkability
From the previous arguments it follows that the uncertainty about the communicating pair
US−D =US +UD is never 0. Moreover, US−D is the largest possible when Eve is not one of
the relays Ri and she does not overhear the last packet of the ﬂow. It is reasonable to assume
that the uncertainty about the destination H(D) is larger than about the source H(S), since
the destination could be any server on the Internet. ThusUS−D takes its smallest value if Eve
is the last relay Rt on the path. In our evaluation we assume this worst-case situation and
numerically evaluate the sender-receiver uncertainty under this condition.
Side Information Attacks
When analyzing the unlinkability properties that our protocol provides, we only considered the
information that the content of the transmitted packets can reveal to an adversary. However,
an adversary may also observe additional side-information; the amount and type of this infor-
mation depends on the actual implementation of the protocol and also on its interplay with
other protocols (e.g. the routing protocol used). Such side information is present irrespective
of the applied anonymizer solution; indeed most known attacks against Tor are of this kind
(e.g. [71, 13]). The possible sources of side information include trafﬁc analysis (timing infor-
mation, number of sent/received packets), topology (routing and location information), and
application level analysis. For an overview of side-channel attacks we refer to [72]. Although it
is not possible to conceal all the side information, by its design, our protocol offers a level of
anonymity comparable to that of Tor.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
We use the simulation environment described in section 2.7.2, with the conﬁguration parame-
ters summarized in Table 2.4. We consider networks with ﬁxed network density per unit area,
that is, for a k-hop area and a given density d (nodes per unit area) we have in total n = k2∗d
nodes. We ﬁrst run the secret-agreement for multi-hop networks described in chapter 2, and
then our trafﬁc anonymization protocol, described above.
Fig. 3.3 and 3.4 numerically evaluate the sender-receiver unlinkability that our protocol
achieves, for different network densities and as a function of the number of nodes in the net-
work. We assume that Eve is the worst-case node for us relay Rt (as we explain in section 3.4);
in this case, the sender-receiver uncertainty equals the source uncertaintyUS =H(S|E). We
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Figure 3.3 – Anonymity for density d = 15 and k ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}.
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Figure 3.4 – Anonymity for density d = 20 and k ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}.
compare this to the ideal uncertainty H(S) Eve would have, if each group member would be
the source with equal probability (note that H(S)= 5 amounts to uniform probability within
a group of size 25). We ﬁnd that with our protocol we can restrict Eve to only learn that the
source belongs in a set of size approximately half the network population; moreover, Eve
perceives each node in the group to be the source with probability very close to uniform.
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3.6 RelatedWork
Our anonymity protocol combines the onion routing of Tor [38] with one-time pad encryp-
tions, to provide protection against computationally unbounded adversaries. There also exist
alternative anonymous routing protocols specially designed for ad-hoc networks (e.g. [103, 58])
but they all build on computational limitations. In our design, we considered privacy in the
presence of a passive adversary; an active adversary might for instance intentionally introduce
timing patterns that she can later identify [71]. Introducing latency and mixing [32] can make
timing attacks more difﬁcult but at the same time decreases throughput.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented the design of a trafﬁc anonymization scheme that exploits
the security properties of the shared secrets, which we can generate using the techniques
described in chapter 2. Our privacy analysis demonstrates that we can achieve a Tor-like level
of anonymity, yet without relying on the computational limitations of Eve. We experimentally
evaluated the performance of our design over various network conﬁgurations, and we showed
that we can achieve almost perfect anonymity within a group of roughly half the network size.
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4 A Lightweight Encryption Protocol for
Sensor Networks
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose a lightweight data encryption protocol suitable for wireless sensor
networks. Differently to our approach so far, we are not interested in strong information-
theoretic security but rather in exploring what additional security we can achieve, when
constrained not to use (or use very few) additional resources to those used for a data collection
task in a wireless sensor network.
We consider a wireless sensor network where individual nodes want to send data to a single
collection point in the network, the sink. We focus on data collection protocols employing
network coding for increased data reliability and in particular to one, SenseCode [55]. Our
goal is to complement SenseCode by adding a layer on top of its operations, so as to enable
encrypted data delivery between each node and the sink during the data collection task.
Our data encryption protocol tries to balance the following requirements:
1. We want to avoid the overhead of a dedicated “key generation/discovery phase” to
construct a pairwise sensor node – sink key before each communication round.
2. We want to use a one-time-pad approach for encryption, as encoding and decoding has
low complexity; that is, at every communication round, use a pairwise secret key known
to each sensor node and the sink, as one-time pad to encrypt the sensor data.
3. We want to use a different pairwise key per communication round, so that an adversary
that captures the key of one round cannot unlock subsequent rounds.
To address these requirements, we propose to construct each key from past data, collected or
overheard in previous communication rounds; in particular, keys are constructed as random
linear combinations of the past data that both the sensor node and the sink have. An important
aspect of this approach is that we can create these keys with low complexity both computa-
tionally and in terms of memory requirements. Thus, we can efﬁciently renew our keys at each
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communication round, with very low cost, as we essentially reuse the communication of past
data for our key generation.
Similarly to our approach in the previous chapters, we design our protocol building on the
fact that, an adversary will not have overheard exactly the same transmissions as any sensor
node in the network. This can happen because the adversary may not be present at all
communication rounds, or may be physically separated from the sensor node. Even if none
of the above happens, with high probability a passive eavesdropper will not overhear exactly
the same transmissions as a node due to the random wireless channel variation and losses.
We strengthen this effect by combining past data across multiple communication rounds to
construct our keys, which would require the adversary to overhear the same data as a node
over multiple communication rounds as well.
Network coding naturally offers weak security, as observed in the literature in the case of
multicasting (the same arguments naturally extend for data collection) [20]. Our protocol can
be viewed as enhancing this network coding security, where we now use linear combinations
not only of current but also past communication rounds. Our main contribution is on how
exactly to perform the mixing across rounds so that we maintain low overhead, that is suitable
for sensor networks. In our evaluation, we explicitly compare the security beneﬁts that our
protocol offers with the security inherently provided by network coding.
The work presented in this chapter is joint work with Emre Atsan and has been presented in
[16].
4.2 Setup and Background
System and AdversaryModel
We consider a sensor network of N sensor nodes and one single collection point, the sink.
The network operates in rounds, and in each round t , every node i would like to reliably
communicate a message xti , i = 1...N , to the sink. Each source message xti is a sequence of
symbols over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq . We assume a data collection protocol that enables network
coding; for the sink to decode the linear combinations of source messages, in every packet
an N-dimensional coding vector FNq is appended. We also assume that our protocol enables
node overhearing; we will use SenseCode [55] to illustrate this effect.
Our adversary, Eve, is a passive eavesdropper or an honest and curious sensor node,i.e., a
node that honestly follows the employed protocols but at the same time attempts to extract
information regarding the other nodes’messages, using the information she has at her disposal.
Any node in our network could be Eve, we have no information regarding her location in the
network. Although Eve is assumed to be limited in network presence, that is, she is restricted
to one (any one) location in the network, e.g., next to one of our sensor nodes, we do not make
any assumptions about her computational and memory capabilities.
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Figure 4.1 – Example of a tree-structured wireless sensor network. Each source routes infor-
mation toward the sink, through its parent node. Overhearing links are depicted with dashed
lines.
Our goal is to design a practical message encryption protocol, on top of the SenseCode
operations, that enables each node to securely communicate its messages to the sink, under
the presence of Eve.
Possible Use-case Scenarios
A use case could be when the collected sensor data are to be sold to customers; a customer, to
avoid paying, could potentially setup an eavesdropping node and try to acquire the data while
it is transmitting towards the sink. Our scheme aims to constrain the stingy customer to learn
at most a small fraction of the data. In another use case, perhaps the sensor nodes themselves
would like, if possible, not to reveal their individual measurements to the other participating
nodes. Our scheme would in this case increase the privacy of the participating nodes.
SenseCode Basics
SenseCode is a data collection protocol, that uses network coding techniques to increase
the reliability of data collection in wireless sensor networks, and it has been developed and
implemented in [55]. SenseCode creates and maintains a tree structure in the network for the
routing of messages towards the sink, as depicted for example in Fig. 4.1.
At every communication round t , each node that has a new message xti generates and sends
out r packets, where r is the redundancy factor, through its parent node in the tree path
towards the sink. Out of the r packets sent, 1 packet is the plain message xti (uncodable
SenseCode packet) and r −1 packets are linear combinations of xti ’s, i.e., a mixing of node’s
own message and other overheard messages (codable SenseCode packets). Each intermediate
node having a packet to forward to a next hop along the path, before doing so, linearly
combines it in an opportunistic manner with its own message and messages from other
nodes, i.e., messages from its children (if any) and overheard messages from its neighbors.
Clearly, the overheard information from neighboring nodes can be plain messages xi ’s or
linear combinations of these (uncodable and codable SenseCode packets, respectively). At
the end of round t , the sink uses all the received packets and tries to decode, so as to obtain
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all the xti ’s. For the sink to be able to successfully decode and eventually obtain all the x
t
i ’s, it
needs to have collected at least N linear independent combinations (given that there were N
different messages produced during round t ) of the xti ’s.
PerformanceMetrics
We are interested in a form of weak security. That is, Eve gets no meaningful information about
a speciﬁc message xi . In particular, if xi and xk take i.i.d. binary values and Eve receives xi⊕xk
we consider both xi and xk to be secure from Eve as she gets no meaningful information about
them.
The reliability for a node i is the percentage of messages that were communicated securely to
the sink from node i during the whole operation of the network, given that one message xti is
generated at each round t . It is deﬁned as:
ρi = # secure xi
′s f r om any other node j
# rounds
, ∀ j = i .
The average reliability ρ, captures the performance of our protocol with the respect to the
whole network, that is, ρ = avg(ρ1, . . . ,ρN ).
Note that our security metric is pessimistic in two ways: (i) we consider a packet xi to be not
secure even if it is secure from all other sensor nodes in the network but one; (ii) at every
round, we implicitly assume that Eve is the node that can at that round decode, thus we give
her a strong advantage.
4.3 Message Encryption Protocol
Our protocol aims to exploit the fact that each node of the network will overhear (and have
in common with the sink) a random subset of linear combinations of the source symbols, as
dictated by the network topology and the channel conditions. More precisely, every node and
the sink share a common collection of xi ’s and linear combinations of these, over multiple
communication rounds. We can use this common information to encrypt future data of node
i from an adversary that does not have full knowledge of the shared data.
We deﬁne the following parameters for our protocol:
• μ : number of rounds in the past from which we select packets to be combined to create
an encryption key.
• q : the ﬁeld size of the vector space used.
During the rest of this section, we use the operation (a||b) to represent the concatenation of
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two given vectors, a and b.
4.3.1 Data Structures
• xti : source message generated by node i at round t . The size of each message x
t
i is ﬁxed
and equal to L bits.
• sti : encryption key created by node i which is used at round t .
• yti = sti +xti : encrypted message of node i at round t . + represents the addition operation
over a given ﬁnite ﬁeld.
• wti : encryption coefﬁcients vector for secret key s
t
i .
1
• pt

= (ct

||dt

) : a SenseCode packet at round t . It is a concatenation of its coding (coefﬁ-
cients) vector (ct

) and payload (dt

) as deﬁned in [55].
dt
=
N∑
j=1
ct[ j ](w
t
j ||ytj )=
(
N∑
j=1
ct[ j ]w
t
j
)
||γt,
where γt

=∑Nj=1 ct[ j ]ytj and ct ∈ FNq .
• P ti : set of packets pt overheard by node i at round t .
• Qi : a FIFO (ﬁrst-in ﬁrst-out) bounded queue of size μ. Its elements are encryption keys
(sti ) and their encryption coefﬁcients (w
t
i ) at node i for the next μ rounds.
• Y : a list of all encrypted messages yti for the last μ rounds. This list will be used for the
reconstruction of encryption key sti at the sink.
4.3.2 Algorithm
Message Creation & Encryption
1. Node i at round t generates a source message xti to be communicated to a common
collecting sink.
2. Encrypted message yti = sti +xti is prepared using the key sti pulled from the top of queue
Qi at round t .
3. yti and the encryption coefﬁcients w
t
i of s
t
i are encapsulated into a SenseCode message
(wti ||yti ) which will be communicated to the sink.
1The size of each wti is μ×N (log2(q)) bits.
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Figure 4.2 – Protocol stack.
Message Collection
1. At each round t , node i communicates the encapsulated message (wti ||yti ) to the sink
using the SenseCode collection protocol (see Fig. 4.2).
2. In order to decode all the encapsulated messages, the sink waits until it receives at least
N linearly independent combinations of them. At the end of round t , the sink tries to
recover as much encapsulated message as possible from all the packets it receives and
overhears.2
3. After recovering yti and w
t
i , the sink runs the key reconstruction and message decryption
phase to obtain the source message xti .
Key Reconstruction &Message Decryption at Sink
1. The sink updates its list Y of encrypted messages with the new yti .
2. Then, the sink needs to reconstruct the secret sti using the encapsulated encryption
coefﬁcients vector wti and the list of encrypted messages list Y as follows:
sti =
μ∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
wti [(k−1)N + j ] yt−kj (4.1)
3. After reconstructing the key sti , node i can obtain the source message x
t
i = yti − sti .
2The payload dtl of the packets received at the sink is random linear combinations of encapsulated messages
(wti ||yti ) of each node i ∈ 1...N .
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t+k wt+k1 st+k1
5 ct+1l c
t+2
l c
t+3
l c
t+4
l γ
t+1
l +γt+2l +γt+3l +γt+4l
6 ct+2l c
t+3
l c
t+4
l γ
t+2
l +γt+3l +γt+4l
7 ct+3l c
t+4
l γ
t+3
l +γt+4l
8 ct+4l γ
t+4
l
Table 4.1 – Contents of queueQ1 at round t +4.
Key construction at node i
1. (Initialization) Node i initializes its key queueQi with a predeﬁned set of initial (possibly
insecure and all zero) μ vectors.
2. At every round t , for each overheard packet pt

∈P ti , node i updates all the elements in
Qi = {(wt+1i ||st+1i ), ..., (w
t+μ
i ||s
t+μ
i )}, ∀k ∈ 1,2,..,μ:
wt+ki (k) = wt+ki (k)+αt,i c t (4.2)
st+ki = st+ki +αt,iγt, (4.3)
where αt
,i ∈ Fq is the random coefﬁcient generated for pt during this update by node i
and wt+ki (k)=
[
wt+ki [(k−1)N +1] . . . wt+ki [kN ]
]
.
3. When a node i pulls an encryption key sti , (w
t
i ||sti ) from the top ofQi , it pushes a new
all zero element (wt+μi ||s
t+μ
i ) to the bottom of the queue. This ensures the size ofQi is
always ﬁxed and equals to μ.
A Key Construction Example
Let μ= 4 and suppose we are interested in the key construction procedure at node 1, starting
from round t +1 up to t +4. Assume that node 1, collects only one packet over these rounds,
i.e., pt+1l , p
t+2
l , p
t+3
l and p
t+4
l . Table 4.1 shows the contents of the queueQ1 at round t +4.
The ﬁrst row represents the head of the queue, the last row the tail, the ﬁrst four columns the
contents of vector wt+k1 and the last column the encryption key s
t+k
1 . For example, at round
t+5, the key st+51 is going to be removed from the top of the queue to be used for encrypting the
source message xt+51 and a new key s
t+9
1 will be initialized and added to the end of the queue.
Once a key st+k1 is used for encryption, its corresponding coefﬁcients vector w
t+k
1 is attached
to the encrypted message yt+k1 . For simplicity, in this example we used α
t
,1 = 1,∀t ,∀.
4.3.3 Cost Analysis
Memory requirements: Each node i at any given round t has to keep the queue Qi in its
memory. The size ofQi is ﬁxed and μ× (L+μ(N × log2(q))) bits. In other words, the queue has
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μ elements of size (L+μ(N × log2(q))). An element of the queue (wti ||sti ) has an encryption
key (sti ) of L bits and encryption coefﬁcients of size μ×N × log2(q) bits.
In order to regenerate the encryption keys at a given round t , the sink should keep a list of
encrypted messages Y for all the N nodes in the last μ rounds. The size of this list in memory
is (μ×L×N ) bits.
Communication overhead: The size of a packet transmitted by our protocol is ((μ+1)×
N × log2(q)+L) bits, where L is the size of a plain message xti . On the other side the size of a
SenseCode packet (without any encryption of message) is (N×log2(q)+L) bits. In other words,
encrypting messages at the nodes costs an extra N ×μ× log2(q) bits per packet transmission.
Note that we are actually using the standard SenseCode protocol with larger messages. We
can, therefore, claim that the number of packets transmitted in the network does not change
compared to SenseCode without encryption (we found that larger packet sizes do not increase
the packet error rates substantially). Moreover, we can signiﬁcantly compress the coding
vectors using techniques similar to [52].
Operational complexity overhead: For every overheard packet inP ti at round t , every node
i updates (an addition operation over ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq ) μ vectors in its key queueQi . Thus, the
main computational overhead introduced (per node per round) by encrypting messages is:
|P ti |×μ additions of 2 vectors of size N × log2(q)+L
On the sink side, the overhead for reconstructing all N keys sti is N
2×μmultiplications of a
vector (size L bits) and a scalar (see Equation 4.1). After reconstructing the keys, sink should
compute the source messages xti , which requires an extra N additions of 2 vectors of size L.
4.4 Protocol Analysis
We start our analysis by observing that the payload of all packets sent by the protocol are
linear combinations of source messages. We can therefore uniquely represent every packet as
a vector that collects the coefﬁcients used for linear combining. In this section we will call this
vector the coding vector of the packet. We deﬁne the vector such that the coefﬁcient used to
linearly combine xti is at position Nt + i of the vector. The length of the vector is in principle
unbounded, but in the following we will always be able to think about the vector as having a
sufﬁcient length, as it will be clear from the context.
Our analysis in the following assumes that the xti ’s are statistically independent across sources
and rounds and are uniformly distributed. This could be because we use distributed source
coding or because the nature of the application data is so. If this is not the case, we will have a
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corresponding reduction in the expected secrecy as determined by the speciﬁc correlation
patterns.
We denote as Πti ∈ FNq the subspace spanned by the coding vectors of the packets node i
collected at round t . We deﬁne Z ti the subspace spanned by the basis vectors of {Π
1
i , . . . ,Π
t
i },
Z ti represents all information that a node i can potentially collect up to round t and therefore
use to recover messages sent by other nodes. We deﬁneW μi the subspace spanned by the basis
vectors of {Πt−μ+1i , . . . ,Π
t
i }, this is the subspace from which the encryption keys s
t
i is chosen.
In the following we will exploit the fact that if the vector eNt+i is not in Z t
′
j , i.e., node j cannot
reconstruct X ti from the linear combinations it has overheard then X
t
i is weakly secure from
node j up to time t ′, i.e., H(X ti |Z t
′
j ). To prove this it is sufﬁcient to observe that eNt+i can be
used to extend a base of Z tj and obtain a set of linearly independent vectors, then observe
that the corresponding linear combinations of source messages are statistically independent,
which implies that X ti is statistically independent from what node j knows and, therefore,
secure. In this section we want to make two points:
• If the subspace overheard by the adversary doesn’t contain the subspace used to create
the secret key of round t on node i then with a non-zero probability the data sent by
node i will be secure even if the adversary overhears all the packets sent in this round.
• By using linear combinations of past data to create keys our protocol doesn’t compro-
mise the security of the data sent in the previous rounds.
For the ﬁrst point, we deﬁne a function g ti as follows:
g ti (μ)
=min
j =i
[dim(W μi )−dim(W
μ
i ∩Z tj )].
Wewill show that g ti (μ) determines the probability of picking a key thatmakes the transmission
of node i in round t secure. The actual value of g ti (μ) depends on the network conditions.
Here, we want to show that if it is bigger than 1 (i.e.the adversary does not collect everything
that node i collected) then our protocol improves the security.
We ﬁrst observe that our protocol chooses keys uniformly at random over W μi . Indeed what
our protocol does is to create a linear combination with random coefﬁcients of the packets
it has overheard. The following lemma shows that this linear combination is distributed
uniformly.
Lemma 5. Given a set of k vectors v1, . . . ,vk ∈ FNq and k uniform and independent random
variables c1, . . . ,ck ∈ Fq , then
∑k
i=1 ci ·vi is uniformly distributed over 〈v1, . . . ,vk〉.
Now we can use the following lemma to ﬁnd what is the probability that a given key is not in
the subspace overheard by the adversary as stated in Proposition 1:
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Lemma 6. Let two subspacesΠi andΠ j of FNq , for whichΠi ⊆Π j . Let also v a vector uniformly
chosen inΠi . Then
Pr[v ∈Π j ]= 1
qβ
,
where β=min j [dim(Πi )−dim(Πi ∩Π j )], ∀i = j .
Proposition 1. An encryption key sti produced by our protocol by node i at round t is secure by
an other node j with probability δ= 1− 1
qg
t
i
(μ)
.
Now, what remains to be proven is that by using a key that is not in Z t−1j we actually secure
the data being transmitted at round t , against node j .
Proposition 2. If sti ∈ Z t−1j then H(X ti |Z tj )=H(X ti ),∀ j = i .
Proof. Node i selects an encryption key sti at round t to encrypt its message x
t
i , i.e. y
t
i = sti +xti .
For simplicity we will write the coding vectors of the packets as elements of FNtq . Now, let vi =
[wi ei ], wherewi ∈ FN (t−1)q , represent the coding vector of the key sti . Also, let b1 . . .bm a basis of
Z t−1j and assume that node j overhears all the y
t
i for round t . Then Z
t
j = 〈b1 . . .bm ,v1, . . . ,vN 〉,
where vectors bi have zeros in the last N entries.
We want to show that node j cannot decode data from node i , i.e., eN ·(t−1)+i ∈ Z tj , ∀i = j .
Suppose that this is not the case, then we can ﬁnd αr and βr such that:
Nt∑
k=1
(
m∑
r=1
αrbr [k]+
N∑
r=1
βr vr [k]
)
ek = eN (t−1)+i (4.4)
The above equation holds if:
m∑
r=1
αrbr [N (t −1)+ i ]+
N∑
r=1
βr vr [N (t −1)+ i ]= 1
and
Nt∑
k=1
k =N (t−1)+i
(
m∑
r=1
αrbr [k]+
N∑
r=1
βr vr [k]
)
ek = 0.
The ﬁrst equation implies that βr = 1, for r = i , since br [N (t −1)+ i ]= 0 for all r , and vr [N (t −
1)+ i ]= 1 for r = i and 0 otherwise. The second equation implies that all βr , for r = i , must be
zero, for we will not be able to cancel out the corresponding eN (t−1)+r term. Now, Equation 4.4
can be rewritten as:
Nt∑
k=1
k =N (t−1)+i
( m∑
r=1
αrbr [k]vi [k]
)
ek +eN (t−1)+i = eN (t−1)+i ⇒
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m∑
r=1
αrbr +
Nt∑
k=1
k =N (t−1)+i
vi [k]ek = 0 (4.5)
However, Equation 4.5 implies that [wi 0N ] should have been in the span of bi . . .bm , which is
a contradiction. Therefore node j cannot decode xti and so H(X
t
i |Z tj )=H(X ti ).
In the next proposition, we argue that using an encryption key at round t , produced by our
protocol, does not compromise the security of the data sent in previous rounds, for which the
adversary already had maximum uncertainty.
Proposition 3. If H(X ti |Z tj )=H(X ti ) then H(X ti |Z t+1j )=H(X ti ), ∀ j = i .
Proof. Let b1 . . .bm a basis of FNtq that spans Z
t
j and c1 . . .cm a basis of F
Nt+1
q , where ci = [bi 0].
By assumption it holds that el ∈ 〈b1 . . .bm〉, where el ∈ FtNq . Given that, it is straightforward to
show that also el ∈ 〈c1 . . .cm〉, where el ∈ FNt+1q , and vice versa.
Let the vector v= [w 1], where w ∈ FNtq , represent a coding vector of the key to be used in round
t +1, and assume that el ∈ 〈c1 . . .cm ,v〉. We can write:
m∑
i=1
Nt+1∑
r=1
αici [r ]er +
Nt+1∑
r=1
γv[r ]er = el ⇒ (4.6)
m∑
i=1
Nt∑
r=1
αibi [r ]er +
Nt∑
r=1
γw[r ]er +γeNt+1 = el . (4.7)
For l ≤Nt , for Equation 4.7 to hold, it should be γ= 0. What remains cannot hold, because
it contradicts the assumption el ∈ 〈b1 . . .bm〉. For l = Nt + 1 , Equation 4.7 does not hold
because by construction, the basis c1 . . .cm cannot span the vector eNt+1. We conclude that
el ∈ 〈c1 . . .cm ,v〉 ∀1 ≤ l ≤ Nt +1, and therefore the uncertainty about message xti after the
observation of round t +1 remains the same.
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
Simulation Environment and Parameters
SenseCode is implemented as a TinyOs module and tested with the TOSSIM simulator [61].
We implemented our encryption protocol in Java, and we evaluate its performance using the
TOSSIM simulation results and the nc-utils toolbox [3]. We used a ﬁxed ﬁeld F24 for the network
coding operations. Each TOSSIM simulation consists of 100 consecutive communication
rounds. We consider the following topologies:
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Figure 4.3 – Reliability - 7×7 Square Topology.
1. a 7×7 square grid (N = 49), with the sink located in the middle of the grid,
2. a 3×16 rectangular grid (N = 48), with the sink located in the middle of the short edge
of the grid.
We conﬁgure each topology with two different inter-node distances: 20 m (sparse deployment)
and 10 m (dense deployment), each of them yielding a different density of the network. For all
the above network deployments, we test the performance of our scheme under the following
scenarios:
• Every node is permanently present in the network.
• Node i can be in either connected or disconnected state. We set the mean time between
failures (MTBF) to 400 sec, and the mean time to repair (MTTR) to 40 sec3.
For the ﬁrst scenario, we consider coded communication, for which nodes introduce a single
codable packet per round (in [55] we describe as codable the packets that we allow the sensor
nodes to linearly combine with other packets before forwarding them to the sink). For the
second scenario, we consider redundancy r = 2, where each node injecting in network one
uncodable and one codable packets per round. We assume that the uncodable packet is
encrypted while the codable is not.
Evaluation Results
We present average reliability results as a function of μ to observe the effect of using larger
windows when creating secret keys. Note that μ = 0 corresponds to the inherent security
provided from the network coding operations in SenseCode. We emphasize that our reliability
metric (see section 4.2) considers as secure only messages that are secured concurrently from
3Selected from [55], as a meaningful use-case for SenseCode.
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Figure 4.4 – Reliability - 3×16 Rectangular Topology.
all possible eavesdroppers, i.e., a communication is secure if none of the network nodes can
recover what was sent.
Fig. 4.3 presents the average reliability ρ as a function of μ, for the square grid topology. We
observe that our protocol increases the average number of secretly communicated messages
by exploiting past communications. In other words, when we increase the parameter μ, we
increase the time window of secrecy accumulation over time. As expected, for higher values of
μ, we provide a better reliability.
For only one coded packet, we see that in a dense deployment the reliability is less, in com-
parison with the sparse, since the nodes overhear more common packets, but still increases
fast with μ. For r = 2, the reliability is degraded due to fact that every node sends at least one
uncoded SenseCode packet, facilitating in that way the task of the adversary. Nevertheless,
our scheme achieves 20% improvement in reliability for small values of μ.
Fig. 4.4 presents similar results for the rectangular topology. In general, this topology provides
less secrecy compared to a square grid, because the information ﬂow (collection tree) is more
concentrated to several points (nodes) in the network compared to a square grid. Even in this
challenging topology, we provide up to 40% increase in terms of reliability for as low as μ= 4.
Note that in both Fig. 4.3 and 4.4, our approach achieves higher reliability as compared to
μ = 0, the reliability achieved by SenseCode alone. For completeness, we provide in Table
4.2 the average percentage of y-packets decoded correctly to the sink per round with each
scheme.
4.6 Related work
Key distribution and establishment in wireless sensor networks has different characteristics,
requirements and limitations than in traditional networks mainly due to the limited resources
on sensor nodes. As a result, the widely accepted key management schemes for traditional
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sparse, 3×16, r = 2 79.0243%
sparse, 3×16, only-coded 64.4745%
sparse, 7×7, r = 2 95.8544%
sparse, 7×7, only coded 79.6517%
dense, 3×16, only-coded 76.5313%
dense, 7×7, only coded 90.8671%
Table 4.2 – Measured average delivery ratio per scheme.
networks have drawbacks for sensor network environments [33], [28], [25]. A popular approach
is the scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor (EG) [40] and follow up works (e.g., [27]), where each
node is provided with a set of cryptographic keys (key ring) randomly selected from a common
pool and uses these as common randomness to create keys with other nodes. Like EG-based
schemes, our nodes also collect random keys, yet our randomness does not come from pre-
distribution but from the randomness of the wireless channel conditions and topology; this
enables us to easily refresh our keys at every round and use them for one-time-pad encryption,
making, therefore, our scheme suitable for protecting against computationally powerful
adversaries.
Our work can also be seen as offering weak security through network coding [20]; lightweight
protocols have been developed for weak security as in [76], [101] yet not applied to sensor
networks. The work in [95] looks at security for network coded sensor networks with keys
distributed by a mobile agent that visits the nodes.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented a data encryption protocol for wireless sensor networks that
builds on top of the operations of a data collection protocol that employs network coding.
Our protocol leverages the shared information, between nodes and the sink across commu-
nication rounds, to enable secure data delivery under the presence of network limited, yet
computationally unconstrained adversaries. Our approach can be viewed as an enhancement
of the weak security that network coding inherently offers, with low additional operational
complexity.
In summary, the contributions in this chapter are:
1. We design a data encryption protocol that integrates well with SenseCode [55], as well as
other protocols that employ network coding over sensor networks, and offers increased
security at low additional complexity.
2. We experimentally evaluate its performance, using the TOSSIM simulator [61] over
several settings.
3. We offer an analysis that supports the trends we observe experimentally.
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5 A Steganographic Mechanism for
Private Messaging
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider the problem where two communication parties, Alice and Bob,
wish to exchange short secret messages such that an adversary, Eve, who observes their
communication, does not know that they are exchanging secret messages, i.e., they wish to
hide from Eve the fact that they are exchanging secret messages. We are interested in enabling
them to do so by hiding their secret message into another innocuous text, and in investigating
if Eve can distinguish between normal messages and messages carrying hidden information.
Linguistic, or text-based, steganography is concerned with the problem of hiding information
within natural text. The majority of existing approaches to linguistic steganography follow the
automated covertext modiﬁcation strategy (see also section 5.7 on related work): given a piece
of natural text referred to as the covertext, hidden bits are embedded by applying modiﬁcations
to the covertext, so as its originalmeaning and grammatical correctness is preserved, that result
into a stegotext object. Despite the beneﬁt of zero user-effort required, these techniques have
signiﬁcant drawbacks. First, the automatically generated stegotexts are typically vulnerable
to steganalysis attacks – methods for detecting the existence of steganography [90, 35, 102];
automation is highly likely to introduce easily detectable syntactic and semantic unnaturalness.
Second, they usually require off-line access to a large amount of linguistic resources and
sophisticated Natural Language Processing tools, which makes them rather impractical to use.
Third, the covert rate achieved, the number of hidden bits per stegotext word, is quite low;
typically, only a few bits are embedded in a very long stegotext.
We design our linguistic steganographic mechanism aiming to address the aforementioned
drawbacks of existing approaches. We refrain from the purely automated covertext modiﬁ-
cation technique and we propose a semi-automated scheme that (a) drops the need for a
dedicated covertext and simply produces a new stegotext for each new message, (b) involves
human interaction: the hidden message is automatically embedded in a sequence of words
that the user edits to create the ﬁnal stegotext. The “user-in-the-loop” involvement has indeed
the beneﬁt of producing high quality stegotexts; the user irons out elements that do not feel
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like natural language. Despite the continuous advances in the NLP ﬁeld, enabled by contribu-
tions from domains such as Deep Machine Learning, we believe that we are still far from being
able to automatically compose perfect natural language. For applications like steganography,
where the slightest hint of unnaturalness could compromise the security, we believe that the
“user-in-the-loop” involvement is a reasonable approach.
The main challenge, for an approach involving the user, is in minimizing the user-effort
required. In our design, we address this by building a dictionary of words and a language
model for producing sequences of words, such that the user can easily combine them into
natural language sentences. We do not require for our encoding process to have off-line access
to linguistic resources, but we rather build the dictionary and the language model out of
small text corpora, as needed. In addition, we design our approach in order to achieve high
covert rate. Note that a low covert rate yields a long stegotext for a secret message of just a few
characters; this enables Eve with a very low complexity detection test: given that the users
normally exchange short messages, a very long message is very likely to be a stegotext.
We implement our steganographic mechanism and we experimentally evaluate its perfor-
mance. We use Amazon’s Mechanical Turk [15], an on-line platform for Human Intelligence
Tasks, to ask human users to modify various stegotexts such that they become meaningful
natural texts. We measure the amount of user-effort required and we demonstrate how our
design choices facilitate the users in their task. We also measure the covert rate achieved
and we show that it is feasible to embed a signiﬁcant amount of bits in small stegotexts. We
evaluate the quality of our stegotexts by using two steganalysis methods that we design for
detecting unnaturalness in sentences. Our observations indicate that, at least by applying our
detection methods, it is rather difﬁcult for our user-enhanced stegotexts to be detected as
suspicious. This corroborates our intuition on the beneﬁts of involving the “user-in-the-loop”.
The work presented in this chapter is also presented in [82].
5.2 Setup
Problem Statement
We consider two communications parties, Alice and Bob, that wish to communicate short
secret messages to each other by using a popular third-party messaging service. Alice and Bob
frequently use this service for their normal communications, but wish to hide from the service
provider that they might occasionally use it for communicating secret messages.
We assume that there exists an adversary, Eve, that has access to the internal infrastructure
of the messaging service. Eve can inspect all the messages passing through the provider and
tries to identify those that might be hiding a secret message. Eve can be the provider itself
or an external adversary that has gained access to the provider’s infrastructure. We assume
that the load of messages that passes through the provider’s infrastructure is large enough to
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prevent Eve from visually inspecting each one of them; she instead runs detection algorithms
to identify the existence of steganography. Note that the last assumption does not imply that
our approach is de-facto vulnerable to human inspection attacks – the “user-in-the-loop” is a
signiﬁcant step toward successfully mitigating these attacks. It rather implies that the load is
such that Eve does not have any better strategy for identifying the steganographic messages
than running a detection algorithm on each message passing through her infrastructure.
Our goal is to design a steganographic mechanism that enables Alice and Bob to exchange
short secret messages, under the presence of Eve, by masking them as innocuous messages.
Eve should not be able to distinguish between normal messages and those carrying hidden
information.
Possible Use-case Scenarios
Users frequently exchange messages over messaging services, e.g., e-mail, chat, tweets, offered
by popular providers, e.g., Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Tweeter, etc. These services are
usually offered for free since the companies’ business models depend mainly on advertising.
That is, the service providers analyze the user data being carried over their infrastructure to
infer information about them and eventually project relevant advertisements through their
applications or collaborating ones. If the users start encrypting their messages to protect
them from providers, they risk to experience degraded quality, or even interruption, of the free
service. The users would like to be a able to use the free service and receive ads tailored for
them, while maintaining the privacy for a small subset of their messages.
As another possible use-case scenario consider an Eve empowered by law that gains access
to the service provider’s infrastructure, despite the fact that the provider is against this. Such
an adversary could be a powerful government or organization. Eve knows that users often
use the messaging service to communicate sensitive information to each other, relying on
their trust in the provider to not share these with unauthorized third-parties; Eve wants to
gain access to this information and potentially use it against them. The provider wishes for
plausible deniability regarding sensitive information of its users. It is possible to offer plausible
deniability by applying steganography, while impossible by simply using encryption.
5.3 SteganographicMechanism
In this section we describe the high-level components of our steganographic mechanism and
we provide an explanation about the role of each component. In section 5.4 we explicitly de-
scribe how we choose to implement the functionality of each component. Our steganographic
scheme consists of an encoder and a decoder and operates as depicted in Fig. 5.1. We assume
in this section, that Alice and Bob have already pre-shared the material they need to perform
the operations described here.
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Figure 5.1 – The basic encoder and decoder components.
Compression/Decompression
The ﬁrst operation we perform is compressing the secret message into a bit sequence. Clearly,
by the nature of the application, a lossless compression technique is required. Assume that
the message is composed by a sequence of n random variables xn taking values in an alphabet
X (e.g. the English alphabet), i.e., xi ∈X , 1≤ i ≤ n. The compression component implements
the operation:
C : xn → {0,1}∗
Respectively, the decompression component implements the inverse operation:
C−1 : {0,1}∗ → xn
Note that we use compression and not just any mapping between source symbols and bits
in order to increase the covert rate of our system. An obvious alternative would be to use the
ASCII (or Unicode) representation of the characters in the message for converting it into a
bit sequence, but this approach would produce a longer sequence than the compressed one
(assuming a compression scheme based on the statistics of the source symbols). As we will
explain next, a longer bit sequence yields a longer stegotext. We require our stegotext to be as
small as possible for the following reasons:
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1. One of our basic premises is the “user-in-the-loop” involvement. We want to make the
task of the user as easy as possible, that is, reduce the effort and time he spends on
modifying a stegotext by reducing its length.
2. The end goal of our system is to produce an “as innocent as possible” stegotext that
will be sent through the third-party provider to Bob. The length of the stegotext may
give away the existence of steganography. For example, assume that Alice and Bob
communicate over chatting, where they usually sent 2-3 sentences per message; a
message that suddenly appears to be much longer, say 20-30 sentences, is an good
candidate to be ﬂagged as suspicious.
Bits-to-words/Words-to-bits mapping
The second operation we perform is mapping the bit sequence to a sequence of linguistic
words, which we refer to as stegotext, and to the words of the stegotext embedding the hidden
message as stego words. Assume thatW is a set of linguistic words and let wm be a sequence
of m random variables taking values inW , i.e., wi ∈W , 1≤ i ≤m. The bits-to-words mapping
component implements the operation:
F : {0,1}∗ →wm
Respectively, the words-to-bits mapping component implements the inverse operation:
F−1 : wm → {0,1}∗
This is, essentially, the stage at which the encoding/decoding of a hidden message happens.
Clearly, the mapping can be implemented in various ways. In section 5.4, we explain how
we perform this operation in two steps: ﬁrst, we use a dictionary that maps bit sequences
of length b bits to sets of words, and then we use a language model that selects words from
the sets, so as to form the sequence wm . For a compressed bit sequence of length c bits,
m = c/b stego words are produced. That is, for achieving high covert rate, we need b to be as
big as possible. In section 5.4.5 we compute an upper bound for b that depends on the input
resources we use for building our dictionary and on other parameters of our design.
User enhancement/Text cleaning
The last operation performed produces the enhanced stegotext that gets sent to Bob. This step
involves Alice manually modifying the stegotext produced from the previous component, in
order to create an “as meaningful as possible” enhanced stegotext, according to her judgment.
Certainly, the modiﬁcations that Alice introduces should comply to some requirements, so as
to enable decoding at the receiver of Bob. Given a sequence wm of stego words from setW ,
the user enhancement component should ensure that Alice is not be able to:
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1. delete or modify any of the m words,
2. change the order of the sequence elements.
3. insert a word from setW in the sequence.
The last requirement is not a strict one, and we discuss later its signiﬁcance. Clearly, Alice is
allowed to insert in the sequence any word w ′ ∉W . The component “Text cleaning” at the
decoder of Bob, ﬁlters out the extra words that Alice has inserted.
The enhancement by the user does not only make the stegotext look like natural language text
but also it helps to personalize it. A possible attack that Eve could launch is to look for user’s
writing patterns: type of words used, punctuation, capitalization etc. Given that Alice and Bob
have been using the third-party messaging service in the past, it is reasonable to assume that
Eve possesses a signiﬁcant fraction of their written communication that she could use to infer
writing patterns. A stegotext that lacks user’s writing style is a good candidate to be ﬂagged as
suspicious.
5.4 Design Choices
In this section we explain how we implement each building block of the steganographic
mechanism we described in section 5.3, and we provide the intuition behind our design
choices. Our goal is to design a mechanism that is easily implementable and practical to use.
5.4.1 Compression
The nature of the English language, i.e., the predictability of the English letter frequencies,
makes the Huffman coding a reasonable choice for compressing the secret message into a bit
sequence, in a lossless and efﬁcient way. Another straightforward observation is that some
words are more likely to occur than others in the English written language; e.g., the words
“the”, “of”, “and”, “is”, “to”, etc. are much more often used in written English texts than others.
In particular, studies have shown that the top 100 most frequently used words in English make
up around 50% of all written material, and the top 300 make up about 65% [42].
We choose to use amixed Huffman coding scheme [51], where the symbol alphabetX includes
all the printable ASCII characters (lower and capital case letters, numbers, space, digits,
punctuation) and a set of frequently used English words E = {w1, . . . ,wr }:
X = {printable ASCII characters} ∪ E
A given mixed Huffman codebook C, implements the compression function C and the de-
compression function C−1. Note that the Huffman code is a preﬁx-free and thus uniquely
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Figure 5.2 – Average percentage of compression achieved by different Huffman codebooks.
decodeable code; in other words, the following property holds for functionC (andC−1, respec-
tively):
C (x1, . . . ,xn)=C (x1) . . .C (xn)
We motivate our choice by investigating the performance of three different Huffman-based
compression techniques:
(a) A character-level Huffman, where the symbol alphabet includes only the printable ASCII
characters.
(b) A mixed Huffman, where the symbol alphabet includes the printable ASCII and the words
from a set E . We form the set E by concatenating the set of the 300 most frequently used
words in English [42] and the NLTK’s stop words set [21]. The result is a set comprising 330
frequently used words.
(c) A word-level Huffman, where the symbol alphabet includes all the words that will appear
in the messages to be compressed; this is an idealistic scheme, which we use as a lower
bound for comparison.
We derive the frequencies of the characters and the words we need from a large training
corpus which we form by concatenating the reuters, the brown and the wikipedia corpora
(approximately 78M characters, 13M words – for more details about the corpora see Table 5.3).
We use the overheard corpus to compress; we derive 4825 sentences of length between 4 and
15 words and we compress each one using the three different techniques.
In Fig.5.2 we show the average compress ratio (in percentage) achieved by each technique.
First, we observe that by using a mixed Huffman approach we gain a non-negligible 7% in
compression w.r.t the character-level Huffman. Second, we see that the ideal scheme of the
word-level Huffman achieves a 44% average compression; this is achieved by considering
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2863 words in the dictionary (these are the unique words appearing in the sentences we chose
to compress). Interestingly, by including only 330 words in the mixed Huffman codebook,
we reach half-way through the gain in performance that the ideal scheme offers. The key
differences are that the mixed Huffman codebook (a) is ten times smaller in size (in KB), (b)
does not need a-priori knowledge of the messages to be compressed, (c) can compress any
message.
Note that Alice and Bob may use the same pre-computed codebook to compress/decompress
messages that can be included in the resources of the implementation or our steganographic
mechanism.
5.4.2 Dictionary
A dictionaryD is a uniquemapping between bit sequences of length b bits and sets of linguistic
words B. In the following, we will refer to such a set as a bin and to the words included in
the bins of a dictionary as bin words. The number of entries in a dictionary, i.e., the number
of unique mappings between sequences of b bits and bins, is the size of the dictionary. We
consider dictionaries of size 2b . Each bin is populated with p words in total.
A given dictionaryD, implements the bit-sequence to bin mapping:
D : {0,1}b →B
Respectively, the bin to bit-sequence mapping:
D−1 : B→ {0,1}b
For convenience, we denote the bin corresponding to the j th entry as B j , where j ∈ {0, . . . ,2b−
1}. We also denote the set of bin words asWB , withWB =⋃B j , ∀ j . If a word in not included in
the bin words set, we refer to it as a stop word and we denote the set of stop words asWS . Note
that a dictionary can be viewed as a ﬁxed-length coding scheme, thus the following property
holds for function D (for D−1, respectively):
D({0,1}∗)=D({0,1}b) . . . D({0,1}b)
A compressed bit sequence of c ≥ b bits is mapped into a bin sequence as follows:
1. The compressed bit sequence is parsed into c/b sub-sequences of length b bits each1.
2. Each sub-sequence is mapped to a bin B j according to a dictionaryD.
The resulting bin sequence can be converted back to the original bit sequence in a determinis-
1If needed, the compressed bit sequences is padded with 0’s at the end. This operation is reverted while
retrieving the hidden message.
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Bit sequence Bin
00 B0 = { to, the, an }
01 B1 = { I, we, you }
10 B2 = {music, piano, weather }
11 B3 = { like, hate, hear }
Table 5.1 – An example dictionary of size 4, with 3 words in each bin.
tic fashion by using the same dictionaryD.
Example: Assume we use b = 2 and p = 3. An example of a dictionary of size 4 is shown in
Table 5.1. Assume a message that has been compressed into the bit sequence “01110010”. The
mapping to the corresponding bin sequence is shown below:
Bit sequence : 01︸︷︷︸ 11︸︷︷︸ 00︸︷︷︸ 10︸︷︷︸
Bin sequence : B1 B3 B0 B2
Any selection of words from the bins B1, B3, B0, B2 carries the compressed bit sequence. For
example, the words “I like the weather” embed the “01110010” bit sequence. In section 5.4.3,
we describe how the selection of words from a bin sequence is performed.
Dictionary Building Algorithm
LetWR denote the set of unique words derived from a text corpus R , E a set of frequently used
English words,WS the set of stop words andWB the set of bin words. A dictionaryDR , of size
2b entries, is created using the corpus R as follows:
1. The setsWB =WR − E andWS =WR ∩ E are computed 2.
2. For every word wi ∈WB , its number of occurrences oi in the corpus R is counted, and
its frequency of occurrence fi is calculated:
fi = oi∑|WB |
j=0 oj
.
3. A vector v, with |v| = p · 2b , is constructed be repeating  fi · p · 2b times each word
wi ∈WB . Finally, the vector v is randomly shufﬂed.
4. All the elements between v[i ] and v[i +p], i ∈ {0,p,2p . . . , (p −1)2b}, are placed in the
bin Bj , j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,2b −1} of the dictionary DR .
2Due to the rounding operation at step 3 of the dictionary building process, some words with very low frequency
might not be eventually placed in a bin. At the end of step 4, the setsWB andWS are accordingly updated to
contain all words within the bins and words from the corpus not placed in a bin, respectively.
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At this point, each word wi ∈WB is, in the worst case, placed in max( fi ·p ·2b , 2b) bins in total.
Key Points
We choose to exclude from the bin words set some frequently used English words (e.g., the
words “a”, “and”, “to”, etc.) in order to give ﬂexibility to the user while enhancing the stegotext.
If a word has been included in the dictionary, it should not be used while enhancing since it
would introduce bits in the original compressed bit sequence and create, thus, ambiguity at
the decoder. As discussed earlier, a small set of words gets very frequently used in English; it
is, therefore, reasonable to assume that with high probability the user will use these words
while enhancing the stegotext, meaning that they should be excluded from the dictionary. In
section 5.6, we demonstrate how we veriﬁed this assumption.
We allow a bin word to appear in more than one bins. If it was required that each bin word
appeared only in one bin, the dictionary size would be restricted to be less or equal to |WB |p ;
reducing the dictionary size, i.e., the parameter b, automatically reduces the achieved covert
rate for a given compressed bit sequence. Another reason for repeating words in different bins
is for increasing the probability of ﬁnding words between adjacent bins of a bin sequence, that
match well in natural language. For example, assume that the word “sunny” is placed only
in bin B1, and the word “weather” in bin B2; unless the bins occur in that order there is no
chance that these words could get selected together. Instead, if both words appeared in more
than one bins, there exist more combinations of bin sequences that allow these words to get
selected.
A word to be placed in a bin is drawn according to the frequency distribution of the words
in R. Note that the way we construct the vector v, implies that a given word wi appears in
it with probability fi . Also, shufﬂing v and assigning p elements to a bin B j , corresponds to
independently sampling p times the vector v. In other words, the p words chosen come from
the frequency distribution of the words in R. The intuition behind this design choice, is that
by having inside a bin words from different frequencies we increase the probability of ﬁnding
suitable combination of words among the bins of a sequence.
The repetition of bin words in more than one bins can be regarded as “introducing noise” in
the communication channel between Alice and Bob. For a given stegotext, i.e., a sequence of
words received, Bob has to infer the bin sequence that these words came from. Clearly, if each
word appears in only one bin of his dictionaryD, the conversion to the correct bin sequence
is straightforward. If each word appears in more than one bins ofD, there exist more than one
possible bin sequences that correspond to the received stegotext. In section 5.4.4, we describe
how the decoder of Bob decides on the most probable bin sequence.
Note that Alice and Bob need to either share the dictionaryD, or independently compute it by
using the same corpus R plus a secret keyK (needed for appropriately shufﬂing in step 3 of
the dictionary building process). This is an unavoidable requirement since sharing bootstrap
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Symbol Meaning
R A text corpus
DR A dictionary based on corpus R
E A set of frequently used English words
WR The set of unique words appearing into corpus R
WB The bin words set; words from R included in the dictionary
WS The stop words set; words from R not included in the dictionary
LR An n-gram model based on corpus R
p Number of words in each dictionary bin
b Length in bits of the compressed bit sub-sequences
k Length in bins of the bin sub-sequences
Table 5.2 – Commonly used symbols in our steganographic scheme.
secretmaterials is a basic premise in any security approach. Nevertheless, care should be taken
on how this sharing is done because any wrong move could make Eve suspicious. A possible
approach could be the following: assume that Alice and Bob already share a symmetric keyK,
and that at some point Alice sends a link to an interesting article she read on-line as a message
to Bob through the messaging service. Bob perceives this action as a hint from Alice to use
this article to build a dictionary. Next time Bob observes a message from Alice on a similar
topic to the one in the article (the stegotext includes words appearing in the article), he can
use his dictionary to scan the received message for hidden messages.
5.4.3 Word Choosing
LanguageModeling with n-grams
Statistical language models are a popular technique for modeling natural language and are
used to assign probabilities to sequences of words. The n-gram model [23] is a type of proba-
bilistic language model for predicting the next word in a sequence of words, in the form of a
(n-1)–order Markov model.
The name of the model comes from the fact that n-grams are used to calculate probabilities
of sequences of words. An n-gram is a sequence of n words derived from a linguistic source.
For example, assume the sentence “the sun is shinning”; the 2-grams derived from this
sentence are “the sun”, “sun is”, “is shinning”. The count of a given n-gram is the number of its
occurrences inside a training corpus.
In an n-gram language model, the probability P(w1, . . . ,wM ) of observing the sequence of
words w1, . . . ,wM is approximated as follows:
P(w1, . . . ,wM )=
M∏
i=1
P(wi |w1, . . . ,wi−1)≈
M∏
i=1
P(wi |wi−(n−1), . . . ,wi−1)
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In other words, the underlying assumption is that the probability of observing the word wi ,
given that words w1, . . . ,wi−1 have been observed in the past, can be approximated by the
probability of observing it considering only a shorter period of the past, i.e., considering only
the preceding n−1 words.
The conditional probabilities, i.e., the probabilities of the n-grams, are calculated using
maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), based on the n-gram frequency counts:
PML(wi |wi−(n−1), . . . ,wi−1)=
count(wi−(n−1), . . . ,wi−1,wi )
count(wi−(n−1), . . . ,wi−1)
In our scheme, we build an n-gram model LR based on a text corpus R ; we use R to extract the
possible n-grams, count their occurrences and compute their probabilities. Note that R is the
same corpus we use to build the dictionaryDR .
Smoothing
An obvious problem with using MLE for approximating the n-gram probabilities is that the n-
grams that have not been observed within a training corpus will be assigned a zero probability.
Given that natural language is highly diverse, even if we consider a very large training corpus
for deriving the counts of the n-grams, the probability of having unseen n-grams (n-grams
that may appear in natural language but not in a speciﬁc training corpus) is rather high. For
this reason, n-gram model probabilities are not in practice directly calculated from the n-
gram frequency counts, but instead by using smoothing techniques, designed to address this
problem.
There exists a variety of smoothing methods in the literature [34], that build on different ideas
for approximating the probabilities of unseen n-grams. We use the Witten-Bell smoothing
technique, which belongs to the family of methods that use linear interpolation between
higher and lower order n-gram counts in order to assign probabilities to unseen n-grams. Our
choice is motivated by the results of the empirical study in [34], where it is demonstrated that
interpolated models outperform other techniques on small training corpora with low counts.
We also use the parametric version of the Witten-Bell algorithm as suggested in [26].
Encoding n-gramModels as FSAs
We use the OpenGrm library [78], a popular and powerful C++ library, that builds on the
functionality of the OpenFst library [77] for generating n-gram language models encoded
as cyclic weighted ﬁnite-state automata (FSA). More precisely, a generated n-gram model is
represented in the form of an acceptor, i.e., an automaton with the input and output labels of
a transition being equal. Finite-state acceptors are used to represent sets of strings; in the case
of n-gram models, the set of n-grams observed in a corpus.
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To build an n-gram model LR we use a text corpus R. In the produced model, every sentence
in R corresponds to a valid path in the FSA. Every transition in the automaton is associated
with a weight that represents the probability of the transition. For every valid path in the
automaton, an associated probability can be computed as the accumulation of the transition
weights along the path. As discussed above, we appropriately smooth the model which means
that there exists valid paths in the model that do not correspond to any sentence in corpus R;
they model unseen word sequences based on the statistics of the n-grams observed in corpus
R. The precise details of the n-gram format in the OpenGrm library are presented in [81].
The OpenGrm library provides an efﬁcient implementation for intersecting two acceptor FSAs.
The result of the intersection between two acceptors is an acceptor in which strings that are
accepted by both automata are retained. We note this useful operation since we use it in
the task of selecting words from a bin sequence with the help of an n-gram model LR , as we
present next.
Word Choosing Algorithm
Given a bin sequence B1, . . . ,Bm of m elements, and a language model LR :
1. The sequence B1, . . . ,Bm is parsed into mk  sub-sequences, each of k elements long.
2. For every sub-sequence, a corresponding FSA is generated; we refer to this FSA as the
bin model associated with the given sub-sequence of bins:
(a) For every bin Bi , a state Si is created. A state Sk+1 is also created.
(b) For every word wj ∈Bi , a transition is added from state Si to destination state Si+1.
The transition is decorated with input label wj and output label wj .
(c) For every state Si and for every word wr ∈WS , a transition is added from state Si
to destination state Si (a self-loop). The transition is decorated with input label wj
and output label wr .
3. For every bin model generated, a sequence of q ≥ k words is produced:
(a) The bin model gets intersected with the language model LR ; the resulting FSA is
referred to as the combined model.
(b) The shortest path in the combined model is computed, i.e., the path with the high-
est probability. The output labels of the shortest path is the sequence wi1, . . . ,wiq
The ﬁnal stegotext w1, . . . ,wq ′ , with q ′ ≥m, is formed as the concatenation of the sequences
wi1, . . . ,wiq , in the order they were produced.
73
Chapter 5. A SteganographicMechanism for PrivateMessaging
Key Points
The FSA constructed for a given sub-sequence of bins (a bin model), is an acceptor that repre-
sents a set A of all strings of words that can be derived by performing the cartesian product
between the bins of the bin sub-sequence. In other words, all the possible combinations of the
bin words of the sub-sequence. This acceptor also represents a set B of strings of words, which
is a proper superset of set A. Set B includes all the strings of A augmented by an arbitrary
number of stop words (words from setWS), placed in-between the bin words and at arbitrary
places.
The combined model model is an acceptor that represents strings of words accepted by both
the language model and the bin model. These strings are essentially the ones appearing in
the language model and (a) contain words from the bins in the given sub-sequence (in the
order of the sub-sequence), (b) may or may not include stop words. The probabilities of LR
are retained in the combined model; by selecting, thus, the most probable path we select the
most probable string of the combined model that satisﬁes (a) and (b), and also is the most
likely to appear in natural language (according to language model LR ).
We parse a given bin sequence into sub-sequences of length k bins, and select words from
each sub-sequence using the language model, independently among sub-sequences. As the
length of the bin sequencem increases, the stricter our requirements from the language model
become: we seek long strings of words containing speciﬁc words in a speciﬁc order. The
probability of succeeding in ﬁnding one drops dramatically as m increases, especially when
considering corpora R of moderate sizes for building LR . We introduce the parameter k to
tune this effect. Finally, the stegotext, i.e., the sequence of stego words w1, . . . ,wq ′ , is possible
to be of length q ′ ≥m. This is because there might exist a number of stop words in-between
the bin words selected.
5.4.4 HiddenMessage Retrieval
As described in section 5.4.2, the way we build the dictionary can be viewed as “introducing
noise” in the communication channel between Alice and Bob. In this section, we describe the
steps performed by the decoder of Bob in order to retrieve the hidden message from a received
stegotext. Our decoder aims in removing the “noise” introduced by the encoding process.
Main Ideas and Examples
Assume that Bob receives a stegotext consisting of three stego words w1,w2,w3, and assume
also that each word appears in two bins of Bob’s dictionaryD: w1 appears in bins B1,B2, w2
in bins B3,B4 and w3 in bins B5,B6. There exist in total eight possible bin sequences, out of
which Bob has to infer the one that is the most probable to have been sent by Alice.
A naive, but effective, approach that Bob could apply would be to convert each of the eight bin
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sequences into messages and then decide, by visually observing the content of each message,
which one was originally sent by Alice. Given that in the English language not every character
combination is possible, i.e., not every compressed bit sequence and, thus, not every bin
sequence is possible, it might be that out of the eight bin sequences that Bob possesses, only
one yields a valid English message. The obvious problem with this naive approach is that as
the length of the stegotext and the number of bins that a word appears in increase, it becomes
impractical because (a) Bob has to go through possibly hundreds of decoded messages to
discover the one sent, (b) each and every bin sequence, out of which the majority is most
probably gibberish, has to be decoded, thus adding operational complexity.
As an alternative approach Bob could start decoding only partially the bin sequences and
gradually reject some of these as improbable. The main idea here is that the decoder of Bob
does not have to decode each sequence till the end, but instead break the decoding process
into steps; at each step the decoder assigns probabilities to the sequences, using only the
part of the sequence available up to this step, and continues to decode the most probable
sequences at the next step. At the ﬁnal step, the decoder outputs the message corresponding
to the bin sequence with the highest probability.
Notation
Given a bin word wi and a dictionaryD with bins B0, . . . ,B2b−1, we deﬁne a setAi as the set
of bins in which word wi appears. Clearly, the size of a set Ai is not ﬁxed and depends on
the dictionaryD. Given a sequence of bin words w1, . . . ,wm there exists a unique sequence
A1, . . . ,Am .
We deﬁne a set of states St , ∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,mr } and r ≤m, such that:
St =Ar (t−1)+1 × Ar (t−1)+2 . . . × Ar (t−1)+r ,
where × denotes the cartesian product over sets. We refer to r as the grouping factor.
By construction, every state in a set St is a distinct sequence of r bins. We refer to state i ∈St ,
as state i at step t . Each state in every step is associated with a state probability i .
We deﬁne a transition probability ai j , between two states i ∈St and j ∈St−1, such that:
ai j =P(st = i | st−1 = j )
where st denotes the state at the current step and st−1 the state at the previous step.
Decoding Algorithm
Given a dictionary D and a sequence of bin words w1, . . . ,wm , the decoder performs the
following steps:
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1. For every word wi , a setAi is constructed.
2. From the sequence A1, . . . ,Am the sequence of sets S1, . . . ,ST , is constructed, where
T = mr , for some grouping factor r ≤m.
3. For every state i ∈S1, its initial state probability is computed: i = P(s1 = i )
4. For every state i ∈St , 1< t ≤ T , its state probability i is computed:
i = max
j∈St−1
 j ai j
Once all the state probabilities have been computed, the most probable state sequence
s∗1 , . . . , s
∗
T is derived as follows:
s∗T = argmaxi∈ST i
s∗t−1 = arg maxj∈St−1  j a j st
Finally, the estimation of the most probable message sent is computed as follows:
m∗ =C−1(D−1(s∗1 , . . . , s∗T )).
Probabilities & Approximations
We assume that the state and transition probabilities can be approximated by the probabilities
given by an m-order Markov model of the English characters. In other words, we use probabil-
ities of sequences of English characters to approximate the probabilities of bin sequences, i.e.,
of the states at each step t .
Recall that a bin sequence can be converted back to a bit sequence using a dictionary D,
and consecutively to a message in English using a Huffman codebook C. We assume a m-
order Markov model M over characters x ∈X , whereX denotes here all the printable ASCII
characters.
The initial state probabilities are computed as follows:
i =P(s1 = i )≈P(B1, . . . ,Br )
=P(D−1(B1, . . . ,Br ))
=P(C−1(D−1(B1, . . . ,Br )))
=P(x1, . . . ,xn)
=
n∏
j=1
P(x j |x j−(m−1), . . . ,x j−1)
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The transition probabilities are computed as follows:
ai j =P(st = i | st−1 = j ))≈P(Br+1, . . . ,Br ′ |B1, . . . ,Br )
=P(D−1(Br+1, . . . ,Br ′) |D−1(B1, . . . ,Br ))
=P(C−1(D−1(Br+1, . . . ,Br ′)) |C−1(D−1(B1, . . . ,Br )))
=P(xn+1, . . . ,xn′ | x1, . . . ,xn)
=
n′∏
j=n+1
P(x j |x j−(m−1), . . . ,x j−1)
Key Points
We make two assumptions: (a) The message sent by Alice is valid English language, (b) Bob
has at his disposal a Markov model M that accurately models the English language. The ﬁrst
assumption implies that messages with typos, very rare words, loans from spoken language,
etc. may be very difﬁcult or impossible to retrieve. The second assumption implies that the
Markov model of the English characters has been trained over a large English text corpus and
also for sufﬁciently large values of m, i.e., character sequences. In section 5.6, we evaluate the
performance of our decoder design, using a 6-order Markov model and we demonstrate that it
is possible to achieve good performance.
5.4.5 Parameter Selection
In this section we derive an upper bound on the value of parameter b, given a corpus R and
a Huffman codebook C, under a complexity constrain at the decoder side. We would like to
maximize the value of b so as to maximize the covert rate of our encoder.
Assume we use a Huffman codebook C, with average codeword lengthCavg . Then the expected
number of characters 3 in a state st would be
b·r
Cavg
, where r is the grouping factor used in the
decoding process. In order to compute the state probability st , we need at least
m
2 characters
within a state, where m is the order of the Markov model of English characters used. Therefore,
a lower bound for r is given by the following equation:
r ≥ m/2 ·Cavg
b
(5.1)
Note that the higher the value of r , the higher the number of characters within a state, but also
the higher the number of states at a given step of the decoding process.
The state space at time t , i.e., the cardinality Nt of the set St , can be upper bounded as follows:
3If a mixed Huffman code is used, the expected number of characters is higher since a symbol can be a word
and may contribute more than one character per codeword.
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Corpus Description
wikipedia Various texts extracted [53] from Wikipedia. 2615 texts, 9M
words.
brown The Brown corpus [1]; texts from 500 sources categorized into
15 genres (e.g., news, editorial, reviews, hobbies etc.), totaling
1.15M words.
reuter s The Reuters corpus [8]; a collection of 10K news documents
that appeared on Reuters newswire in 1987, 1.3M words, various
categories.
novel s Two publicly available novels through Project Gutenberg [6]; “A
tale of two cities”, by C. Dickens, and “Siddhartha”, by H. Hesse,
totaling 54K words.
overheard Conversations overheard in the city of New York [4].
Table 5.3 – Useful text corpora.
Nt = |Ar (t−1)+1| · |Ar (t−1)+2| · . . . · |Ar (t−1)+r | ≤
(
fmax ·p ·2b
)r
, (5.2)
where fmax ·p ·2b (with fmax =maxi fi and fi denoting the frequency of occurrence of bin
word wi in corpus R) is the maximum number of bins any bin word may appear in dictionary
DR , i.e., the maximum cardinality of any set Ai , assuming that we use a corpus for which
fmax ·p < 1.
Note that the number of states at time t grows exponentially with the grouping factor r . The
same holds for the total number of transitions computed between steps t −1 and t .
Assume that, at the decoder there exists a constrain Nmax on the maximum number of states
per step t , i.e., Nt ≤Nmax . Taking the minimum r from Eq. 5.1 and the maximum Nt from Eq.
5.2, we upper bound b as follows:
b ≤ m/2 ·Cavg · log2( fmax ·p)
log2Nmax −m/2 ·Cavg
(5.3)
5.5 Steganalysis Methods
In this section we describe two steganalysis methods, for attacking our steganographic scheme,
that aim in detecting unnaturalness in the stegotexts and ﬂag them as suspicious. The meth-
ods we design work at the granularity of a sentence, as opposed to the majority of existing
steganalysis techniques [35, 102, 36] that operate at a text granularity and are usually inef-
fective for short texts. We assume that an adversary Eve, as modeled in section 5.2, has the
possibility to launch these attacks on each message that crosses her infrastructure. We note
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that the methods we design may not be the optimal way to detect unnaturalness in a sentence,
but we believe our approach is a ﬁrst step toward solving a non-trivial NLP problem.
Stanford Parser
The Stanford Parser [47, 65] is a popular natural language parser, developed from the Stanford
Natural Language Processing Group, and its purpose is to infer the grammatical structure of
sentences. It falls into the category of probabilistic parsers that use knowledge on language,
acquired through hand-annotated sentences, for producing the most likely analysis of new
sentences. The lexicalized PCFG parser for the English language, included in the distribution
of the parser, has been trained on the collection of syntactically annotated data from the
Penn Treebank Project [5]. The parser produces various information on a tested sentence,
including the part-of-speech (POS) tagging and the syntactical dependencies of its words, the
grammatical analysis of the sentence in a form of a tree, the probability (or score) of the most
likely parsing of the sentence, etc.
We use the score and the POS tags produced on tested sentences to construct statistical tests
for detecting unnaturalness in sentences.
5.5.1 Classiﬁcation Using Prediction Intervals
A prediction interval (PI) is an interval that can be computed based on observations z1, . . . ,zn ,
such that a future observation will take a value within this interval with probability γ. They
are practically used when the distribution, or its parameters, from which the observations
take values, is unknown. Given an iid sequence z1, . . . ,zn ,zn+1, a prediction interval at level
γ= 1−α can be computed, using Theorem 2.4.1 from [59], as follows:[
zn(n+1) a2 , z
n
(n+1)(1− a2 )
]
,
where zn(1), . . . ,z
n
(n) denotes the ordered statistic of z1, . . . ,zn and α≥ 2n+1 .
We assume that our adversary has access to a large quantity of natural language (NL) texts that
she uses to train her attack algorithm. More precisely, the adversary uses a parser to infer the
scores of the sentences in the natural language texts, and computes a prediction interval at
level γ= 0.95 based on the observations of the scores, normalized by the sentence length. The
observations have been checked for the iid property, using the Ljung-Box statistical test [63],
and have been appropriately down-sampled when the property did not hold, before being
used to compute the prediction interval.
The adversary can perform the following simple test, in order to ﬂag on-the-ﬂy an observed
message as suspicious or not: she uses a parser to infer the scores, normalized by length, of the
sentences in the message, and checks if they fall within the pre-computed prediction interval.
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If many of them fall outside, then this message is ﬂagged as suspicious.
We imitate the behavior of the adversary: we ﬁrst use the Stanford Parser to infer the normal-
ized scores of approximately 155K sentences, derived from a training corpus (concatenation
of the wikipedia, reuters, brown and novels corpora – see Table 5.3 for a description of each
corpus), and then we compute the prediction interval. We also create three different testing
sets of sentences:
(a) 10K natural language sentences excluded from the initial training corpus.
(b) 10K random sentences, of length between 5 and 40 words, produced using an on-line
random sentence generator 4 [7].
(c) 10K pseudo-random sentences, produced by performing random walks in a 5-gram lan-
guage model encoded as an FSM and trained on the brown corpus.
We ﬁnd that 98% of the observations from testing set (a) falls within the intended prediction
interval, i.e., they are classiﬁed as NL sentences, while only 4% of the scores from set (b)
do; the prediction interval test works rather good in telling apart NL to random sentences.
Interestingly, for set (c) we get 83% of the observations being inside the prediction interval;
the partial underlying structure of the sentences makes the scores being very close to natural
language scores, and hence confusing the classiﬁer that, nevertheless, still classiﬁes a 17% of
these as non NL.
In the evaluation section, we use the prediction interval technique to classify the sentences of
the stegotexts. We refer to this technique as the PI classiﬁer.
5.5.2 Classiﬁcation Using SVMs
Support vector machines (SVMs) are supervised learning models with associated learning
algorithms used for data classiﬁcation. Given a set of training observations z1, . . . ,zn , with zi ∈
Rd , each marked for belonging to a category (or class), an SVM learning algorithm computes a
decision function that predicts the class of new observations. An SVM is a representational
model of the training observations as points in space, mapped such that observations from
different classes are separated by a clear gap that is as wide as possible. In linear classiﬁcation,
the decision function is the optimal hyperplane inRd . In non-linear classiﬁcation, a non-linear
decision function is computed by projecting the observations through a function φ to a space
with a higher dimension, commonly referred to as the feature space F , and by computing the
optimal hyperplane in F .
The One-Class SVMs [87] is a category of SVMs, where all the training observations belong to
only one class. Such a model separates the training points from the origin (in feature space
4The sentences are random only in terms of grammar and syntax; the words used are normal English words.
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F ) and maximizes the distance from this hyperplane to the origin. The result is a binary
decision function which captures regions in the input space where the probability density
of the training observations lives. The function returns 1 in a “small” region (capturing the
training points) and −1 elsewhere. If for a new observation the decision function returns
−1, this observation is labeled as out-of-class. In Appendix B, we include the mathematical
description of the One-Class SVMs.
We assume that our adversary, Eve, uses an One-Class SVM to identify if a given observed
message is a stegotext or not. As previously, we assume that Eve has at her disposal a large
quantity of NL sentences that she uses to train her SVM. More precisely, for each sentence i
she uses a parser to infer its score and its POS tags, and she constructs the following vector:
zi =< score, #nouns, #verbs, #adverbs, #adjectives, length>,
that is, a feature vector with the score, the number of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs
(each normalized by the sentence length in words) and the length in words, as features.
Eve uses her observations z1, . . . ,zn , to train an One-Class SVM, using a Gaussian Radial Base
Function (RBF) kernel function, and ν = 0.10. The feature vectors are scaled properly per
dimension 5. For every newly observed message she analyzes its sentences and decides if the
message should be ﬂagged as suspicious or not.
We imitate the behavior of Eve: we use the sentences in the training corpus, as deﬁned before,
and the Stanford Parser to infer the scores and the POS tags, in order to construct the training
set of observations. For sanity check, we test the performance of our SVM using the testing
sets of sentences (a), (b), (c).
We ﬁnd that 95% of the sentences in set (a) are classiﬁed as NL. For the sentences in set (b) this
percentage is only 3%: the classiﬁer successfully classiﬁes the random sentences as out-of-
class, i.e., as nonNL sentences. The sentences in set (c) are classiﬁed as natural language with a
percentage of 65%: the SVM classiﬁer has a better performance regarding the pseudo-random
sentences, in comparison to the PI classiﬁer.
In the evaluation section, we use the One-Class SVM classiﬁer described here to classify the
sentences of our stegotexts. We refer to this technique as the SVM classiﬁer.
5.6 Experimental Evaluation
5.6.1 Encoder
In this section we evaluate the performance of our encoder. Our goal is to answer the following
questions: How much effort is required from human users for enhancing our stegotexts? Do
5We use the same scale for scaling the feature vectors of the testing sets.
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Corpus Parameters
Name Description |WR | |WB | |WS | b p k
dreams A long-form article from “The
Guardian” about dreams and
academic anxiety.
425 277 148 6 5 4
animals A collection of stories for kids
about animals.
1600 823 777 6 15 3
facebook A long-form article from Buz-
zFeed about Facebook.
1423 461 962 5 15 3
Table 5.4 – Input parameters for the MTurk experiments.
our design choices assist them into doing so? What is the covert rate achieved by our scheme?
Finally, do the stegotexts and the user enhanced stegotexts pass our steganalysis attacks?
MTurk Platform
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [15] is a on-line platform for enabling the use of human
intelligence in various tasks. Businesses, researchers or individuals (referred to as Requesters)
post short tasks, known as Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), which become available through
the MTurk platform to a pool of users, known as Workers. The Workers have the possibility to
browse among the available tasks and choose the ones they wish to complete in exchange for
a payment from the Requester.
We use the MTurk platform for evaluating the effort required by human users to turn various
stegotexts produced by our encoder into meaningful natural language texts. We prepare a set
of HITs, with each HIT consisting of a set of incomplete sentences that we ask the users to
complete so as to become meaningful. Each set of incomplete sentences essentially consists
of the stego words, produced by our encoder, that embed a given hidden message. We provide
an interface for completing sentences, that hinders the users from modifying the stego words
and altering their order, but allows them to introduce any word or punctuation mark among
the stego words, as they wish. In Fig. 5.3 we show our interface and an example of sentence
completion; the dashed lines between the displayed words represent the gaps into which the
user can insert words.
In Table 5.4 we show the corpus and the parameter values we use in each experiment. For a
corpus R, we produce a dictionary DR and a 5-gram language model LR , and we encode 50
different messages of length between 4 and 15 words, derived from the overheard corpus. We
encode the messages three times, each time using one of the following techniques:
1. Random: Instead of using a language model for selecting words from bins, we just pick
uniformly at random a bin word from each bin of a given bin sequence.
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(a) Before completion.
(b) After completion.
Figure 5.3 – The user interface for sentence completion in MTurk.
2. N-grams: We select words from the bins, using the language model LR , as described in
section 5.4.3. We do not output the stop words produced by the encoder, only the bin
words.
3. Complete: The words from the bins are selected using LR . The resulting stegotext
consists of the bin words and the stop words selected by the encoder.
Note that for the third technique we modify appropriately the user interface for the MTurk
experiments, so as to display the stop words pre-inserted in the gaps. The users are free to
delete/reuse/modify these at their will.
In every experiment we use the same mixed Huffman codebook, in which we include 330
frequently used English words, as explained in section 5.4.1, with average codeword length
12.73 bits. For each dictionary, we computed the value of parameter b using Eq. 5.3. We also
note that we use either k = 3 or k = 4, since initial results from the MTurk platform suggested
that users ﬁnd it rather difﬁcult to complete sentences of 5 words and more.
Finally, we mention that our payment for each HIT was $1.00, which translated into approxi-
mately $0.2 per minute and was well above the average MTurk wage; this an important aspect
of the study since Workers are usually negatively biased regarding the difﬁculty of a task, if
the ratio of the time spent for a HIT over the payment is large. We restricted the maximum
number of HITs that a user could do from each experiment to 3.
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PerformanceMetrics
We evaluate the amount of user-effort required for completing a HIT using the following
metrics:
• Difﬁculty: The users are asked to evaluate the difﬁculty of a HIT, once completing it, by
assigning a score between 1 and 5, with 1 representing a “Very Easy” task and 5 a “Very
Difﬁcult” task.
• Completion time: The amount of time needed for a user to complete a HIT. We measure
the time between the moment the user starts reading the given sentences and the
moment they declare they are done enhancing them.
• Extra words: The number newly inserted words by the user while completing a set of
sentences.
We also measure the covert rate achieved by our encoder: the amount of hidden bits per word
of enhanced stegotext. It is deﬁned as follows:
Covert Rate= # hidden bits
#words in enhanced stegotext
Results on User-effort
In Fig, 5.4a, 5.4b, 5.4c we demonstrate the average difﬁculty, completion time (in minutes)
and number of user inserted extra words, respectively, for each corpus and for each encoding
technique. The values reported are averaged over the number of HITs and the error bars
indicate the standard deviation of the measurements.
First, we observe that for all three corpora thengrams and complete approaches outperform the
random one, indicating that our word-choosing approach offers some beneﬁts in assisting the
user to complete the sentences. Even though the users report a level of difﬁculty comparable
to random (Fig. 5.4a), the completion time they need and the number of words they introduce
is always smaller. Especially for the case of complete, where stop words are pre-inserted
between stego words, the users introduce up to roughly half the amount of words they do for
the random, and usually in less time.
Second, we observe that there exist differences among corpora. The dreams corpus seems to
require more effort than the others. This is mainly due to three reasons: (a) The vocabulary
of the dreams corpus was more domain speciﬁc, in comparison to the other two; the task of
combining words of this domain in sentences was more difﬁcult for the average user. The
animals and facebook topics are closer to the general knowledge. (b) The dictionary used for
dreams includes only p = 5 words per bin, in contrast to p = 15 words per bin used for the other
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(a) Average reported difﬁculty per HIT.
(b) Average completion time per HIT.
(c) Average number of extra words inserted by users per HIT.
Figure 5.4 – Measurements on the user-effort required for completing our MTurk HITs.
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Figure 5.5 – Average covert rate achieved per HIT.
two experiments. By increasing the number of words per bin we increase the probability of
ﬁnding suitable words from consecutive bins that the users can combine easier in a sentence.
(c) The sentences produced for dreams included k = 4 stego words, whereas for the other two
experiments only k = 3, which users found easier to complete.
Third, we note that the users report, on average, a difﬁculty score between 3 and 4, which
translates to “Moderate” to “Difﬁcult” task. This fact should be explained in the context of the
MTurk platform: the opinion of the users regarding these HITs, is possible to be biased from
their opinion on other MTurk HITs. The HITs including writing are usually regarded as the
most demanding ones in comparison to others available in the platform. Out of all the HITs
we published, a user would do on average 5 of them, and an average MTurk user does tens of
them in a day. Therefore, we believe that the difﬁculty reported is mainly in comparison to
other HITs and does not reﬂect purely the opinion of the users on our HITs.
Finally, we mention here that we also measured the rate at which a user inserts words that
appear in the dictionary of the encoder. Note that our user interface in MTurk, does not hinder
the users from inserting bin words, as explained in section 5.3, allowing us to measure this rate.
We observed that by excluding from a dictionary words that are in the top 100 most frequently
used words in English, we get an approximate insertion rate of 1 word per sentence. That is, in
every sentence that a user enhances he will introduce one bin word. This rate indicates that
such insertions can be prevented by a smart user interface that consults the user to avoid the
use of this word without decreasing dramatically the user experience.
Results on Covert Rate
In Fig. 5.5 we demonstrate the average covert rate achieved, in bits per word, for all corpora
and encoding techniques.
First, we observe that on average the covert rate achieved by our scheme is roughly 3 bits per
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(a) The dreams corpus. (b) The animals corpus.
(c) The facebook corpus.
Figure 5.6 – Percentage of sentences classiﬁed as NL by the PI classiﬁer.
word of enhanced stegotext. This means that for sending out a hidden message consisting of 5
words, each one consisting on average of 5.5 characters, we need an enhanced stegotext of
around 73 words. This is well above the covert rate achieved usually from existing text-based
steganographic approaches (see also section 5.7 on related work).
Second, we observe that the ngrams slightly outperforms the random approach; this is due to
the fact that the users introduce less words per sentence while enhancing. We note that the
rate for complete appears to be lower than the ngrams because the ﬁnal length of the enhanced
stegotext includes the newly inserted words by the user (as shown in Fig. 5.4c) plus the already
pre-inserted words, that the user may or may not use.
Finally, we observe the effect of the values of parameters b and k on the covert rate. For dreams
and animals we used b = 6 whereas for facebook b = 5; for a given message, the higher the
b, the smaller the corresponding bin sequence length, the smaller stego text produced, the
less sentences to enhance. Note that despite the users inserting less words per sentence for
facebook (Fig. 5.4c), since for b = 5 the users have to enhance more sentences, the total rate
drops. The difference between dreams and animals is explained due to the different values
of k used (k = 4 and k = 3, respectively): the higher the value of k, the less sentences the user
needs to enhance, resulting into an increased overall rate.
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Results on Steganalysis Attacks
We investigate the performance of the attacks described in section 5.5. In Fig. 5.6 and 5.7 we
demonstrate the results for the PI and the SVM classiﬁers, respectively. For each experiment
conﬁguration and each encoding technique used, we show the percentage of sentences from
stegotexts and enhanced stegotexts that were classiﬁed as natural language (NL) sentences.
First, we look at the performance of the PI classiﬁer (Fig. 5.6). We observe that, before enhance-
ment, the complete approach clearly outperforms the other two: the sentences produced
with the help of the language model, that include stop words, are resembling NL sentences,
at least while using this speciﬁc classiﬁer. Also, the selection of words from the bins with
ngrams seems to produce more NL sentences than when choosing randomly. Given that the
MTurk users write NL sentences, the majority (more than 95% in all cases) of the sentences
in the enhanced stegotexts are classiﬁed as natural. Of course, the PI classiﬁer has limited
capabilities, and the results indicate that, by just looking at the sentence’s score, we cannot
detect unnaturalness in pure stegotexts with high conﬁdence.
Next, we look at the performance of the SVM classiﬁer (Fig. 5.7). Clearly, the SVM classiﬁer
performs better in detecting unnaturalness since a very high percentage of sentences from the
random and the ngrams stegotexts are classiﬁed as non NL; this is expected since the stego
words produced by these two techniques are not truly NL sentences, especially when using
random selection of words from bins. Again, the sentences we produce with the complete
technique are closer to NL sentences, but not more than 50%. This is another indication
that this technique produces stegotexts that require less enhancing effort. Regarding the
enhanced stegotexts, we again observe that a large fraction of these are classiﬁed as NL, with
the percentage being around 90% – a bit lower compared to the PI classiﬁer; this is expected
since the SVM classiﬁer is more powerful and, thus, able to detect some weird sentences
composed by the users, who did not put the maximum effort into enhancing the stegotexts.
5.6.2 Decoder
The decoder we presented in section 5.4.4, is a type of probabilistic decoder that tries to infer
the most probable message sent by Alice, out of all the possible decodings available. We
implemented our decoder design and, in this section, we evaluate its performance.
As explained in section 5.4.4, our decoder uses an m-order Markov model of the English
characters to approximate the probabilities of states and transitions. We build such a 6-order
model by counting the occurrences of character tuples6 in a large training text corpus and
by using these to compute the conditional probabilities of the model. We note that, the
compressed data of the model amounts to 43MB.
6We count the occurrences of all tuples of length l , ∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,m+1}.
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(a) The dreams corpus. (b) The animals corpus.
(c) The facebook corpus.
Figure 5.7 – Percentage of sentences classiﬁed as NL by the SVM classiﬁer.
PerformanceMetric
We evaluate the performance of our decoder by measuring the error rate of decoded messages.
It is deﬁned as follows:
Error Rate= # erroneously decoded tokens
# total decoded tokens
,
where as tokens we use characters and words. I.e., we measure the character error rate and
word error rate of a decoded message.
Results
In Table 5.5 we show the percentage of messages that were correctly decoded, i.e., that had a
zero error rate, for each experiment, considering all stegotexts produced with each encoding
technique. We see that our decoder was able to decode correctly a very high percentage of
the encoded messages. We note that this percentage was consistently around 95%, for many
off-line experiments we run, indicating that this error is due to the limited capabilities of the
6-order Markov model.
For the few cases of erroneously decoded messages, we demonstrate in Fig. 5.8 and 5.9 the
average character and word error rate, respectively. We see that the erroneously decoded
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Experiment Correctly decoded (%)
dreams 96%
animals 93%
facebook 95%
Table 5.5 – Percentage of messages decoded correctly.
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Figure 5.8 – Average character error rate of messages not decoded correctly.
messages are not completely corrupted but only partially, i.e., on average 15% of characters
were corrupted, inﬂuencing up to 18% of the words in the messages. We note that for the
majority of the erroneously decoded messages, the correct message was included in the list of
the top ten most probable decodings.
5.7 RelatedWork
The majority of existing approaches to linguistic steganography follow the traditional strategy
of automated covertext modiﬁcation. Popular such techniques include word substitution
[97, 31, 93, 30], sentence structure manipulation [73, 68], phrase paraphrasing [29], semantics
transformations [91, 94], hiding information in errors [92], etc. Many of these techniques
require access to sophisticated NLP tools, e.g., semantic role parsers, POS taggers, anaphora
resolution tools, etc., and large linguistic datasets, e.g., the WordNet lexical database [12], the
Web 1T corpus [11] and the Google n-grams database [2]. Moreover, they usually introduce
grammatical, syntactic and semantic anomalies in the stegotext, easily detectable by steganal-
ysis methods [90, 35, 102, 36]. Finally, the existing techniques achieve a covert rate of less than
1 bit per covertext word.
Recently, some approaches have appeared that include the “user-in-the-loop”. Closer to our
work is the approach presented in [46] and followed by [45], where the effectiveness of the
user intervention on the stegotext is demonstrated using human judges. Similarly to us, the
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Figure 5.9 – Average word error rate of messages not decoded correctly.
proposed approach consists of mapping the hidden message to a sequence of words which the
user modiﬁes to produce text. Differently to us, no signiﬁcant attention is given in the way the
stego word sets are formed or in the way words get chosen from sets, so that less user-effort is
required. In addition, no thorough evaluation is provided on quantifying the amount of effort
needed, and on measuring the achieved covert rate; a demonstrated example implies a covert
rate of 0.5 bits per word. In [96], the authors propose a technique for Twitter that embeds 4
bits per tweet by modifying previous tweets, partially aided by the human user.
An interesting technique is the on-line tool Spammimic [9] that maps the hidden message
to a set of natural language sentences that are eventually combined to form a spam e-mail.
Alice can copy-paste the output of the tool and send it as a normal e-mail to Bob, who, upon
reception, uses the on-line decoder to retrieve the hidden message. Although it requires
zero user-effort, Spammimic has some signiﬁcant drawbacks. First, modern e-mail providers
usually ﬁlter out spam e-mails, so Bob risks to miss it. Second, it is rather unusual that normal
users, like Alice and Bob, will exchange spam e-mails, so this action immediately classiﬁes
the e-mail as suspicious. Third, the output of Spammimic is rather long for very short input
messages. For example, the message “hello” produces an e-mail of 15 sentences and 185 words
in total, which yields a covert rate of 0.3 bits per word.
Our approach differs from the existing ones since its design aims in achieving high covert rate,
while remaining practical and usable. The “user-in-the-loop” design choice we do may require
higher amount of user-effort but it also introduces elements that make robust our stegotexts
to sophisticated detection attacks. We believe that privacy-aware users would be willing to put
in a reasonable amount of effort in exchange for secretly communicating short phrases and
not just a few bits.
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5.8 Summary
In this chapter we presented a linguistic steganographic mechanism for enabling two com-
munication parties to exchange private messages such that an adversary, who observes their
communication, is not aware of this fact. First, we designed a semi-automated encoder that
embeds a hidden message into a sequence of words that the user manually enhances to
produce natural language text. Our encoder does not require off-line access to large linguistic
resources and sophisticated NLP tools and it is easily implementable. Second, we presented
two steganalysis methods for detecting unnaturalness in text, that operate at the granularity
of a sentence. Finally, we designed a probabilistic decoder suitable for removing the “noise”
introduced by the encoding process.
We implemented our steganographic mechanism and we experimentally evaluated its per-
formance. First, we designed and launched an on-line campaign on the MTurk platform, in
order to evaluate the amount of effort needed by human users to enhance the output of our
encoder. We observed that our design choices assist the human users in their task, without
requiring an unreasonable amount of user-effort, and that our approach achieves a good
covert rate. Second, we applied the steganalysis methods we designed both on the raw and the
enhanced output of the encoder, and we demonstrated that the “user-in-the-loop” helps in
hiding the existence of steganography. Finally, we evaluated the performance of our decoder
under restricted linguistic resources, and we demonstrated that it performs well.
In summary, the contributions in this chapter are:
• We design a steganographic mechanism for masking hidden messages as innocuous text,
in order to enable private communications over untrustworthy messaging providers.
• We evaluate our approach by experimenting with human users through the MTurk
platform and by applying steganalysis methods that we design.
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A Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We consider our eavesdropper to be either Eve or one of the participating terminals. Our
eavesdropper has two occasions to obtain information about the secret Si j : by overhearing
a fraction of the transmitted x-packets in the initial phase; or because a terminal knows the
source packets it transmitted. Both these effects are captured in the calculation of the number
Mi j . Under the theoretical conditions of the erasure channel model, we can approximate
these numbers with their average value; Lemma 8 shows that this approximation can become
arbitrarily good exponentially fast in N . Given that we use any value Mi j smaller or equal to
the exact, the following Lemma 7 gives a construction that does not allow the eavesdropper to
obtain any information about Si j . 
Lemma 7. Consider a set of N x-packets, say x1, . . . ,xN , and assume an eavesdropper, Eve, has
a subset of size NE of the x-packets. Construct M =N −NE y-packets, say y1, . . . , yM , as
Y = AX ,
where matrix X has as rows the N x-packets, matrix Y has as rows the N −NE y-packets, and A
is the generator matrix of a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) linear code with parameters
[N ,N −NE ,NE +1] (e.g., a Reed-Solomon code [64]). Then the M y-packets are information-
theoretically secure from Eve, irrespective of which subset (of size NE) of the x-packets Eve
has.
Proof. Let W be a matrix that has as rows the packets Eve has. To prove that the y-packets are
information-theoretically secure from Eve, we must show that:
H(Y |W )=H(Y ).
We can write [
Y
W
]
=
[
A
AE
]
X
de f= BX ,
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where AE is a NE ×N matrix of rank(AE )=NE , which speciﬁes the NE distinct x-packets that
are known to Eve. AE is not known to us, however we know is that in each row of AE there is
only one 1 and the remaining elements are zero; so all of the vectors in the row span of AE
have Hamming weight (the number of nonzero elements of a vector [64]) less than or equal to
NE . On the other hand, from construction, rank(A)=N −NE , and each vector in the row span
of A has Hamming weight larger than or equal to NE +1 [64]; thus the row span of A and AE
are disjoint (except for the zero vector) and the matrix B is full-rank, i.e. rank(B)=N .
If the packets xi have length L, we have that:
H(Y |W )=H(Y ,W )−H(W )=
= rank(B)L− rank(AE )L = (N −NE )L
= rank(A)L =H(Y ).
A.2 Concentration to expected values
Lemma 8. The values of the random variables Mi j , UrE , Vl , as deﬁned in section 2.3.2 and
used in Lemma 1, converge exponentially fast in N to their expected values.
Proof. Consider the random variableUrE denoting the number of x-packets transmitted by Tr
and received by both Ti /Tj but not Eve. We use a standard argument to show it concentrates
exponentially fast to its average. Deﬁne the random variable η(l )q as
η(l )q =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if the qth x-packet is received
by terminals Ti /Tj and missed by Eve,
0 otherwise.
Then we can writeUrE =∑Nq=1η(l )q and we have
μ E(UrE )= (1−δr i )(1−δr j )δrEN .
For 0< ≤ 1 we can write P[UrE −μ≥ μ]≤ exp(− 2μ3 ) , where in the last inequality we use
Chernoff bound [70, Chapter 4]. We can also write, for 0< ≤ 1, P[UrE −μ≤ μ]≤ exp(− 2μ2 ) .
Similar arguments hold for the remaining variables in section 2.3.2.
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B Mathematical Formulation of One-
Class SVMs
The Support Vector Method For Novelty Detection by Schölkopf et al. [87], essentially maps all
the data points into a feature space F and separates them from the origin (in feature space F )
with maximum margin. Consider a training data set x1, . . . ,xn ∈X , where n ∈N is the number
of observations and X a compact subset of Rd . Let φ be a feature map X → F , i.e., a map
into a dot product space F such that the dot product in the image of φ can be computed by
evaluating some function
K (x,y)= (φ(x) ·φ(y)).
The K (x,y) is known as the kernel function. Popular choices for the kernel function are linear,
polynomial, sigmoidal but mostly the Gaussian Radial Base Function (RBF):
K (x,y)= e ||x−y||2/c ,
where c is a kernel parameter and ||x−y||2 is the dissimilarity measure.
To separate the observation points set from the origin, the following quadratic program is
solved:
min
w∈F , ξ∈Rn , ρ∈R
1
2
||w ||2+ 1
νn
∑
i
ξi −ρ
subject to: (w ·φ(xi ))≥ ρ−ξi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
ξi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
The parameter ν ∈ (0,1) characterizes the solution:
• It deﬁnes an upper bound on the fraction of outliers (training observations considered
as out-of-class)
• It is a lower bound on the number of training observations used as Support Vector.
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The decision function (classiﬁcation) rule for a data point x is:
f (x)= sgn((w ·φ(x))−ρ)= sgn
(∑
i
αi K (x,xi )−ρ
)
,
where αi are the Lagrange multipliers, computed by deriving and solving the dual problem.
The non-zero ai ’s are called the Support Vectors.
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